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PLEA BARGAININGS BASELINES 
JOSH BOWERS*
ABSTRACT
In this Symposium Article, I examine the Courts unwillingness to
take seriously the issue of coercion as it applies to plea bargaining
practice. It is not so much that the Court has ignored coercion
entirely. Rather, it has framed the inquiry in a legalistic manner that
has made immaterial the kinds of considerations we might think
most relevant to the evaluation. The Court has refused to ask quali-
tative questions about felt pressure, prosecutorial motivation, or the
risk or reality of excessive punishment. All that matters is legal
permissibility. A prosecutor may compel a defendant to plead guilty
as long as she uses only code law to do so. In this way, the Courts
coercion baseline is legalisticit is defined by what the prosecutor is
legally entitled to pursue.
Recently, however, the Court has shifted its constitutional focus
away from code law. In a series of right-to-counsel cases, it has
redefined prevailing plea bargaining practice as the benchmark.
This amounts to an emerging extralegalistic baseline, defined not by
code law but rather by the parties efforts to circumvent it. Of course,
the Court did not mean to alter coercions landscape and almost
certainly will not do so. My intention is to demonstrate only that the
doctrinal building blocks are in place for the adoption of a better
baselinea proportionality baseline.  I defend this alternative ex-
tralegalistic baseline and even prescribe a practical methodology for
its discovery. And, notably, my preferred approach is not without
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precedent. The Court has applied analogous extralegalistic baselines
to claims of coercion in other constitutional contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
What does it mean for a guilty plea to be voluntary? As I have
examined elsewhere, the Supreme Court has adopted a procedural
conception of voluntariness that principally demands that the defen-
dant plead[] guilty with his eyes open.1 That is to say, a guilty plea
is voluntary as long as the defendant is given fair notice of the
charges, the rights waived, and the consequences of pleading guilty.2
By focusing almost exclusively on a procedural doctrine of fully in-
formed bargaining, the Court has neglected to examine substantive
questions of when and whether a plea or trial sentence is dispropor-
tionate, or when and whether the sentencing differential between
plea and trial is so great that the defendant was given no practical
choice but to take the deal. Likewise, the Court has held prosecuto-
rial motivation irrelevant.3 Thus, a prosecutor may freely threaten
sentences of death or mandatory life without parole even if her ob-
jective is only to compel a plea to a term of years.4 Of course, the
charge must be supported by probable cause.5 But this measure of
technical legal guiltor formal legality, as Bill Stuntz termed
itis the touchstone.6 Concretely, a charge supported by probable
cause can never be coercive. And, as long as the defendant sees the
charge coming, his plea is constitutionally voluntary.7
The Court has recently revisited the practice of plea bargaining
in a series of cases establishing the right to effective assistance of
counsel during negotiations and pleas. As in the past, the Court has
kept its focus on notice. In Missouri v. Frye, the Court held that
1. Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Re-
sponse to Professor Bibas, 2 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 52, 61 (2011) [hereinafter Bowers, Fundamen-
tal Fairness]; see also Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1149
(2013) [hereinafter Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel]; infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1970) (quoting Sheldon v.
United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), revd on confession of error on
other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
3. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 364.
6. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 258 (2011).
7. See Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 1, at 61; Bowers, Two Rights to Coun-
sel, supra note 1, at 1149.
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defense attorneys are constitutionally obligated to make clients
aware of formal plea offers.8 And in Lafler v. Cooper, the Court
suggested that defense attorneys are also obligated to give constitu-
tionally adequate advice about the wisdom of pleading guilty.9
Again, the Courts perspective is that a defendant constitutionally
accepts or refuses a plea bargain when he satisfactorily understands
his options.10 The question is not the substantive degree of bargain-
ing pressure, but only whether the defendant is sufficiently aware
of that pressure. In this way, coercion remains irrelevantor, at
most, an afterthought.
At a conceptual level, however, the Courts decisions in Lafler and
Frye did break ground. For the first time, the Court owned up to a
somewhat embarrassing factthat ours is a system of pleas, not a
system of trials.11 With this acknowledgment, the Court came to
grips with plea bargains and guilty pleas as the expected mode of
disposition. How does this change matters? One may persuasively
argue that the Court has effectively reset the baseline against which
constitutional infirmities are measured in the plea bargaining con-
text. The trial is no longer the benchmark. To the contrary, the
defendants in Lafler and Frye were able to demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel for negotiation errorsnot errors at the
pretrial, trial, or sentencing stages.12 Most notably, in Lafler, the
defendant suffered a constitutional injury from the loss of the plea
opportunitythe opportunity to access the negotiated sentence
that he otherwise would have received in the ordinary course.13
Thus, the Court redefined the ordinary course as the plea bargain
and recognized the market price14 as the baseline against which
8. See 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
9. See 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383, 1390-91 (2012).
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
12. See id. at 1384, 1386; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406-08, 1411.
13. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387.
14. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1959 (1992). In this context, the market price is defined as the jurisdiction-specific penalty
typically received by similarly situated defendants convicted after plea. Id. (explaining that
the market price is the sentence usually assigned after a guilty plea in similar cases); cf.
Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
79, 82 (2011) (analogizing the plea bargain market to car dealerships where most purchasers
get the going rate, while only a few suckers pay full sticker price for a car).
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the constitutional injury was to be evaluated. More to the point, it
established that, in some circumstances, the defendant might even
enjoy a constitutional entitlement to what is sometimes called the
market price.15
But what does this have to do with coercion? At first blush, not
much. Nor do I harbor illusions that the Court might reorient its
plea bargaining focus from procedural notice to substantive pres-
sure. Long ago, the Court assumed away the coercion question.16 We
should not expect it to retread that terrain any time soon. In this
sense, the aim of my project is modest. I intend to show only that
the Courts recent decisions have made its underlying assumptions
that much harder to sustain.
To understand what I mean, the reader may require some
grounding in theories of coercion. This is no easy task because coer-
cion is just too contested. Nevertheless, there is fair consensus for
the proposition that only threats, not offers, may coerce.17 More im-
portantly, the Courts rhetoric has reflected this propositionthat
plea proposals constitute offers, noncoercive opportunities to make
defendants better off than they otherwise would have been.18
The question of whether a plea proposal constitutes an offer, as
opposed to a threat, depends in the first instance on the applicable
baseline.19 And for any coercion question there are many prospective
baselines. Most theorists lump baselines into one of two camps:
predictive or normative.20 At the risk of oversimplification, a predic-
tive baseline is what a person empirically would expect to happen in
the ordinary course.21 A normative baseline is what a person legally,
morally, or prudentially is entitled to expect in the ordinary course.22
So where does that leave us? In Part I, I explore what I under-
stand to be the Courts two prevailing baselines in this context. The
first is a predictive baseline defined by the trial punishment. On
15. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1959.
16. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
17. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204 (1987).
18. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 367 (1978).
19. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 13 (2001) (dividing baselines into two categoriespositive
and normativewith the positive category further divided into history and prediction).
20. See, e.g., id.
21. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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this reading, the trial sentence is the anticipated criminal sanction,
and, against that baseline, all plea proposals are offers with cor-
responding benefits.23 The second is a normative baseline defined by
what the prosecutor is lawfully entitled to do.24 According to this
conception of coercion, a permissible criminal charge (a count sup-
ported by probable cause) cannot constitute a threat, because the
prosecutor has the authoritylegalistically definedto pursue it in
the first instance.25 In such circumstances, the plea proposal oper-
ates only to make the defendant better off than he was lawfully
entitled to be.26 I think it is fair to say that, as a matter of positive
law, this legalistic baseline has been doing comparatively more work
than the predictive baseline.27
In Part II, I examine the manner by which the Courts decisions
in Lafler and Frye may have resetor at least upsetthe conven-
tional plea bargaining baselines. In these cases, the Court finally
took frank notice of the long-apparent fact that the guilty plea is the
expected mode of disposition and, consequently, that the negotiated
sentence is the anticipated penalty. Deviations from plea prices
thereby constitute deviations from the Courts newfound predictive
baseline. More importantly, as Justice Scalia emphasized in a pair
of characteristically scathing dissents, the Court has even estab-
lished something of a constitutional entitlement to plea bargain.28 In
doing so, the Court arguably has come to adopt a competing legal-
istic baseline premised upon the defendants limited constitutional
right to access at least some plea proposals.
Next, I explain that, with its predictive and normative shift, the
Court may even have subtly laid the foundation for a weak version
of what I consider to be the proper baselinea normative baseline
grounded in an entitlement to proportional punishment.
In Part III, I clarify why a proportionality baseline is, in fact, the
proper baseline (at least as a supplement to the Courts prevailing
legalistic baseline). Thereafter, I offer a methodology by which the
Court might discover the parameters of a proportionality baseline
23. See infra text accompanying note 69.
24. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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and evaluate claims of coercion against it. Finally, I apply that
methodology to one case, Bordenkircher v. Hayes,29 in which the
Court should have found coercion but failed to do so.
I am not the first to endorse proportionality as a prospective mea-
sure for claims of coercion.30 And, no doubt, the Court has ostensible
reasons for rejecting this baseline. For the Court, inquiries into
proportionality and purpose are just too murkytoo subjective and
indeterminatefor a criminal justice system that depends upon
hard rules. As I have argued previously, the Courts concerns may
be overblown.31 In fact, the judiciary is not so ill-equipped to
consider equitable questions.32 In any event, it may do better than
the executive branch, to which such questions are almost exclusively
left.33
More interestingly, the Court has sometimes endorsed a quali-
tative conception of unconstitutional coercion, and in Part IV, I
examine one such contextjudicial regulation of conditional federal
spending measures. Of course, there are obvious differences be-
tween plea bargaining and conditional spending34 (and, for that
matter, any of the many other constitutional settings in which ques-
tions of coercion arise). The point is not that the Court needs to be
consistent across constitutional contextsonly that the Court some-
times considers itself competent to know coercion when it sees it.
I conclude by explaining what likely accounts for the Courts
hesitance to regulate the potentially coercive nature of negotiated
guilty pleas.35 In the process, I identify an underlying alternative
normative baselinea prudential baseline. By the Courts estima-
tion, plea bargaining is simply too big to fail. In turn, the system
cannot tolerate any form of oversight that even plausibly could un-
dermine the practice. But, to my thinking, the Court is too cautious
29. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
30. See infra text accompanying note 193.
31. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
32. Cf. Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecog-
nized Point of a Pointless Indignity, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 994 n.25, 1029, 1034, 1039-40,
1044-45 (2014).
33. See id. at 1029.
34. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
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in its estimation. Plea bargaining is plenty strong enough to with-
stand a bit of light constitutional tinkering.
I. BARGAINING BENEFITS
When it comes to the practice of plea bargaining, the issue of
coercion would seem to be front and center.36 The Court, however,
has largely skirted the issue. In its very first plea bargaining case,37
Brady v. United States, the Court concluded without much explana-
tion that the negotiated sentence constituted only a benefit to a
defendant in exchange for his ready and willing admission to his
crime.38 The terminology is critical. Once the Court framed the bar-
gain as an offer to provide benefits to those who choose to take it,
the coercion question was all but foreclosed.
A. Baselines: A Primer
As conventionally (but not universally) understood, benefits
cannot coerce.39 Benefits do not coerce, because offers do not coerce,
and an offer is defined as a proposal to provide a benefit. Offers do
not coerce because they enhance autonomy by promoting choice.40
36. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatists Guide
to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2016 (2000) (indicating that
one of [t]he most common criticisms of the practice of plea bargaining is that the threat of
much harsher penalties after trial is impermissibly coercive upon defendants); see also
WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 122 (It can be argued ... that plea bargaining is not just
coercive under abnormally stressful conditions, but that coercion is the norm.).
37. Robert Schehr, The Emperors New Clothes: Intellectual Dishonesty and the Unconsti-
tutionality of Plea-Bargaining, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 385, 402-03 (2015).
38. 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (emphasis added); see also Howard E. Abrams, Systemic Coer-
cion: Unconstitutional Conditions in the Criminal Law, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128,
128, 154 (1981) (criticizing the Court for its unarticulated purely conclusory approachits
intellectual abstinence in deciding Bordenkircher v. Hayes and Griffin v. California).
39. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 136 (We ordinarily say that threats to make a
person worse off are coercive whereas offers to make him better off are not.); Robert Nozick,
Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440,
447 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (If [a proposal] makes the consequences of [the
recipients] action worse than they would have been in the normal and expected course of
events, it is a threat; if it makes the consequences better, it is an offer.).
40. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 204 ([T]hreats are coercive whereas offers are
not .... [T]hreats limit freedom, whereas offers enhance it.). On the unconventional view that
even an offer may coerce, see infra notes 300-10 and accompanying text (discussing the claim).
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Conversely, penalties do coerce, because threats coerce. And a
threat is defined as a proposal backed by a penalty.41
Of course, this reasoning is all circular. It invitesalmost begs
the question. An offer depends on the existence of a benefit; in turn,
a benefit is the product of an offer. A threat depends on the exis-
tence of a penalty; in turn, a penalty is the product of a threat. The
Court has made no serious attempt to resolve the circularity.42
Nevertheless, coercion theory can resolve it. The determination of
whether a proposal promises sticks or carrots depends upon the
baseline against which benefits and threats are measured.43
Baselines may be described as predictive or normative.44 Accord-
ing to a predictive baseline, the point of reference is what, descrip-
tively, the recipient of a proposal would anticipate occurring in the
ordinary course.45 With a normative baseline, the point of reference
is what the recipient would be entitledmorally, prudentially, or
legallyto anticipate occurring in the ordinary course.46 With this
in mind, consider the gunmans paradigmatic coercive proposal:
Your money or your life. Ordinarily, I can empirically expect to
41. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Coercion & Moral Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF
ACTION 63, 67 (Ted Honderich ed., 1973) (Threatening a person is generally thought to
require justification, while there is no similar presumption against the legitimacy of making
someone an offer.... [A] threat holds out to its recipient the danger of incurring a penalty,
while an offer holds out to him the possibility of gaining a benefit.).
42. See Abrams, supra note 38, at 154-55.
43. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 136 ([T]o characterize a proposal as an offer or
a threat, we need a baseline from which to evaluate the proposala view of the persons
present situation, a view of his status quo.); Peter Westen, Freedom and CoercionVirtue
Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 589 ([W]hether a given proposal is a threat or
an offer depends entirely on the baseline condition by which it is measured.).
44. Cf. Berman, supra note 19, at 16 (dividing baselines into three camps (not two), but
concluding that the concept of coercion remains irreducibly normative). 
45. Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1371-74 (1984).
46. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 262 (1974) (Other peoples actions
place limits on ones available opportunities. Whether this makes ones resulting action non-
voluntary depends upon whether these others had the right to act as they did.);
WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 217, 251 (To set Bs moral baseline, we need to know what
A is morally required to do for B (or not do to B).); E. Allan Farnsworth, Coercion in Contract
Law, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 329, 336 (1982) (attributing to Nozick the argument that a
proposal is coercive if what is proposed is from the victims point of view worse than the
normal or expected course of events ... or worse than the morally expected course of events);
Westen, supra note 43, at 589 (A coercive constraint is anything that leaves a person worse
off either than he otherwise expects to be or than he ought to be for refusing to do the
proponents bidding.).
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keep both my money and my life. Thus, the proposal is coercive as
against any conceivable predictive baseline. And, ordinarily, I can
expect to retain the legal and moral right to keep both my money
and my life.47 Moreover, the gunman has no legal or moral entitle-
ment to either. The proposal is thus coercive as against any
conceivable normative baseline.48
The possibility also exists that different predictive and norma-
tive baselines may lead to different outcomes. Consider Robert
Nozicks slave example.49 A slave owner proposes not to beat his
slave, provided the slave agrees to work on his normal day of rest.50
The slave owner is cruel (is there another kind?) and has a long
history of administering daily beatings.51 Against this precedent, we
may expect the slave to be beaten in the absence of the proposal,
and so the proposal might not be coercive as against a predictive
baseline.52 But, of course, the slave is morally entitled not to be
beaten under any circumstance, and so the proposal is coercive as
against one type of normative baselinethat is, a moral-philosophic
baseline, defined by a given ethical principle.53 At the same time,
the slave owner may be legally entitled to beat his slave (pursuant
to the backward legal rules of the backward slave state), and so the
proposal might not be coercive as against another type of normative
baselinea legalistic baseline, defined by positive law.54
47. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 135 (We evaluate the victims choices by compar-
ing them with his choices prior to the gunmans proposal. The victim must now waive one
right (his money) in order to preserve another (his life), whereas he previously had both his
money and his life.).
48. See id. at 127 (The gunmans proposal is wrong ... because he has no right to do what
he threatens to do, namely, to kill his victim.); cf. Abrams, supra note 38, at 153 (Penalty
... embodies a normative concept.). Of course, the rough sketch is incomplete. There are many
variations of predictive and normative baselines, and a theorist may even mix and match
them. See, e.g., Nozick, supra note 39, at 447 (The term expected is meant to shift between
or straddle predicted and morally required.).
49. Nozick, supra note 39, at 450-51.
50. See Westen, supra note 43, at 583.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. ([T]he baseline that renders the proposal a threat is not a description of the
condition that [the slave] actually expects to occupy, but a prescription of the condition he
ought to occupy ... for refusing to do the slaveholders bidding.).
54. See id. at 586 (distinguishing moral and legal baselines).
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B. Plea Bargainings Predictive Baseline
How does this translate to the practice of plea bargaining? Again,
we must determine whether the bargaining defendant is threatened
with a penalty for asserting his rights or whether he is rewarded for
his cooperation.55 Implicit in the Courts supposition that plea bar-
gains provide advantages to defendants,56 there would seem to be
two prospective baselines in playone predictive and one norma-
tive. According to the predictive baseline, a jury trial is taken to be
the ordinary coursethe expected outcome.57 Any downward devia-
tion from a trial conviction sentence is considered exceptional and,
consequently, a benefit.
I do not pretend that the Court genuinely subscribed to the per-
spective that trials, in fact, do constitute the ordinary course. I
cannot believe that the Court remained for so long blithely unaware
of the predominance of the plea bargaining practice. But it is true
thatjurisprudentially, though not empiricallythe Court treated
the jury trial as if it were the sine qua non of American criminal
justicethe exorbitant gold standard of American justice.58 This
is what Stephanos Bibas meant when he called the full-dress jury
trial the Courts frame of referenceits touchstone.59
Bibas criticized the Court for its anachronistic trial fixation.60 And
I think he was right to do so. But, for present purposes, it is enough
just to understand the implications of this fictive predictive baseline.
From there, the Court could assume a mutuality of advantagea
set of benefits that flowed from the practice of plea bargaining.61
55. See Abrams, supra note 38, at 153 (One ought not be penalized for asserting ones
rights, but one surely may be rewarded for helping the state.).
56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
57. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012).
58. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1121-22 (2011); see also Albert W. Alschuler,
Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 685
(2013) (Defenders of plea negotiation typically treat post-trial sentences as the baseline from
which plea agreements are to be judged.).
60. Bibas, supra note 59, at 1121 (describing the Courts jurisprudential approach as
stuck in the eighteenth century).
61. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); see also Bibas, supra note 59, at
1125 (Trials remain as benchmarks against which both sides can measure their mutual ad-
vantages and as fallbacks against bargaining coercion.).
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C. Plea Bargainings Normative Baseline
The better reading, however, is that the Court subscribed to a
normative baseline, rooted in positive code lawwhat I term a le-
galistic baseline and what Alan Wertheimer termed a rights-based
baseline.62 This baseline represents the options that the state has
a right to exercise.63 And, according to this baseline, technically
viable charges cannot coerce. The argument is not that defendants
typically face these viable charges at trial (a dubious empirical
claim), but rather that prosecutorsshould they choose to do
soare legally entitled to force defendants to face these charges.
When a prosecutor proposes to push ahead with a particular trial
charge, her proposal is no threat, because she has the right ... to
carry out [her] declared unilateral plan.64
Comparatively, before Lafler and Frye, defendants legal entitle-
ments were thought to include only their trial rights against these
legally viable trial charges.65 That is to say, defendants possessed no
entitlement to plea bargain.66 Manyindeed, mostdefendants
have been fortunate enough to receive offers for negotiated lesser
sentences,67 but luck is not law. On this reading, we may distinguish
the prosecutor from the gunman. The gunman is an outlaw, but the
prosecutor operates within the law.68 Put differently, highway
62. WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 137 ([The] rights-based baseline analysis has been
crucial to several plea bargaining decisions.); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 58-70 (1975) (describ-
ing the Courts theory of coercion as requiring a threat of unlawful action).
63. WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 137 (On this view, if the state proposes to impose less
punishment than it is otherwise entitled to do, the state is making an offer, and offers do not
coerce. Call this a rights-based baseline analysis.). 
64. Id. at 127. According to Bob Scott and Bill Stuntz, the prosecutors legal entitlement
amounts to a probabilistic entitlement to put the defendant in jail before the bargain is
struck. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1929.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
67. See Abrams, supra note 38, at 133 n.29.
68. As I have explained previously:
[Although] the Court has seen fit to forbid plea-bargaining pressure that
amounts to ... mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant [,]  ... it
has held expressly that the kind of mental coercion implicit to a chargeeven
to a capital charge or mandatory charge of life without paroledoes not qualify
as [unconstitutional] mental coercion. As long as any such charge is legally sup-
portable, the attendant pressure amounts to no more than legal justice in action.
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robbery does not describe the ordinary course because it does not
describe a lawful course. By contrast, a legally permissible charge
is, by its nature, a lawful courseand a lawful course is the
ordinary course within a system of law. According to this perspec-
tive, the only remedy left available to the defendant is the legally
prescribed remedydismissal or acquittal at trial. The plea pro-
posal amounts to nothing other than an exercise of prosecutorial
gracean offer with corresponding benefits.69
This view explains how the Court has avoided extending the doc-
trine against unconstitutional conditions to the practice of plea
bargaining.70 The defendant is not selling his trial rights; he is only
avoiding what a prosecutor was legally authorized, at her election,
to force him to face.71 Of course, the principle of legality dictates that
the prosecutor may not compel a plea by threatening to charge a
noncrime (or an actual crime for which there is no proof), just as a
prosecutor may not, in the first instance, charge a noncrime (or an
actual crime for which there is no proof).72 But with a codified crime
and probable cause to believe the defendant is guilty of it, the pro-
secutors charge is never impermissible. In such circumstances, the
prosecutors authority to chargeand, thereafter, to bargain with
those chargesis practically plenary.73
Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1147-48 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 750 (1970)).
69. See Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED.
SENTG REP. 126, 128 (2012) (The plea bargain is merely the process by which the prosecu-
torin the nature of a benign sovereigndoes less than she legally could do (because what
she could do is often much worse than what the defendant normatively deserves).); see also
Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and
the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008) (observing that prosecutorial
charging authority may be best described as an exercise of sovereign prerogative).
70. Abrams, supra note 38, at 128 (discussing Bordenkircher) (By refusing to recognize
that an extreme difference in degree can result in a difference in kind, the Court, by
intellectual abstinence, declined to extend the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to
criminal procedure.); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (holding
constitutional a charge intended to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not
guilty); infra Part IV (discussing unconstitutional conditions).
71. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
72. See infra notes 83-102 (discussing what constitutes permissible prosecutorial
bargaining behavior).
73. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-06 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
criminal prosecution as a purely executive power over which prosecutors retain exclusive
control); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) ([T]he courts are not to
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United
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For better or worse, the legalistic baseline amounts to a formalis-
tic baseline. The only judicial inquiry is entirely objectivewhether
probable cause exists to believe that the defendant is technically
legally guilty. On this reading of coercion, a court must deem
immaterial all extralegalistic considerations, like prosecutorial
motivation or felt pressure. These alternative considerations are re-
jected not only because they are taken to be unduly subjective and
contextual, but also because they are immaterial to the formal legal
analysisthe operative question of legal guilt. Thus, a prosecutor
may file or promise to file a draconian charge that even she feels is
much too harsh. Moreover, she may frankly admit that she is doing
so for no other reason than to provoke a guilty plea.74
This is precisely what happened in Bordenkircher. Because the
defendant refused to save the court the inconvenience and neces-
sity of a trial by accepting a five-year plea deal for forgery of an
eighty-eight dollar check, the prosecutor made good on her promise
to file a habitual-offender charge, which carried a mandatory sen-
tence of life without parole.75 The defendant could make no claim
that the prosecutor had failed to bargain in good faith; he could not
emphasize the parties unequal bargaining power, nor could he com-
plain that his mandatory trial sentence was undeserved or other-
wise disproportionate.76 More to the point, he could not highlight the
very real pressure intrinsic to the substantial differential between
States in their control over criminal prosecutions.); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1659-60
(2010); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discre-
tion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1481 (2008) (describing the prosecutors nearly plenary discretion
to charge); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1540-41 n.71 (1981) (describing an almost unbroken line of cases upholding prosecutors
powers to decide who and how to charge, and collecting cases).
74. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
75. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358-59, 358 n.1.
76. See STUNTZ, supra note 6, at 258 (discussing Bordenkircher and concluding that the
fairness of the charge was irrelevant; instead [t]he only question ... was ... formal legality);
WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 133 (discussing Bordenkircher and observing that the Su-
preme Court held, in effect, that there is no significant distinction between offering a more
lenient punishment than permitted under an original charge and threatening a more severe
punishment than permitted under the original chargeif the more severe punishment is
otherwise legally permissible); Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1141 (ex-
plaining that the Court has done too little to promote the substantive fairness of bargains and
pleas and that, instead, the practice of plea bargaining is subject to only a legalistic probable
cause check).
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his trial sentence and the plea proposal.77 The legally authorized
trial sentence defined the baseline. Against that baseline, the pro-
secutor had offered the defendant a generous offera significant
benefitwhich he foolishly passed up.78
Even the specter of death does not coerce as long as the prose-
cutor is legally authorized to impose the risk. In Brady v. United
States, the first case in which the Court considered the constitution-
ality of plea bargaining,79 it rejected the defendants claim that his
plea to a thirty-year prison sentence was involuntarythat it was
compelled by his panic in the face of a capital charge.80 To its credit,
the Court observed that a prosecutor could not subject a defendant
to mental coercion overbearing the will,81 but it held without ex-
planation that the defendants mortal fear was not that.82 For the
Court, mental coercion turned on the existence of a prosecutors
improper charging and bargaining behavior, and, implicitly, it read
impropriety to mean legal impermissibility only.83
In an early plea bargaining dissent, Justice Brennan expressed
greater enthusiasm for a more capacious and qualitative conception
77. See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text (discussing the pressure intrinsic to
sentencing differentials); cf. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1920 (The duress argument
against plea bargaining is that the large differential between post-trial and post-plea sen-
tences creates a coercive environment in which the criminal defendant has no real alternative
but to plead guilty. No plea produced by that sort of pressure could be deemed voluntary.).
78. Cf. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1920 (explaining that the size of the sentencing
differential may be said to represent only the generosity of the plea deal).
79. See Schehr, supra note 37, at 402-03.
80. See 397 U.S. 742, 743-44, 758 (1970).
81. Id. at 750.
82. See id. at 755 ([A] plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the
possibility of a death penalty.); see also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 791, 794-95
(1970) (companion case to Brady, holding constitutional a plea taken from juvenile facing
capital charge).
83. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 ([A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences ... must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation ... , or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper
as having no proper relationship to the prosecutors business (e.g. bribes). (quoting Shelton
v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957))) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added); WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 133 (discussing legal permissibility); cf. Ellis v. First
Natl Bank, 260 S.W. 714, 715 (Ark. 1924) (It is not duress to threaten to do that which a
party has a legal right to do.); Farnsworth, supra note 46, at 334 ([An] improper threat[] ...
is a threat to do something one has no legal right to do .... Can there be duress if the person
making the threat has a right to do the thing that he threatens to do? Courts have often said
that such a threat cannot be duress.) (emphasis added).
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of coercion, explaining that [t]he critical question that divides the
Court is what constitutes an impermissible factor.84 Justice
Brennan would have asked the contextual question of whether the
defendant practically had retained and exercised free will.85 But by
adopting its legalistic baseline, the Court assumed away actual
compulsion and examined only whether the defendant was improp-
erly compelledthat is, compelled by extralegalistic force.86
To some degree, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have
codified the Courts legalistic perspective. To wit, Rule 11 provides
that a lawful guilty plea may not be a product of threats, or prom-
ises (other than promises in a plea agreement).87 This distinction
between ordinary promises and plea bargaining promises would
seem to be somewhat cryptic. One may wonder what the difference
is between the two.88 However, the rule makes perfect sense when
considered against the legalistic baseline. That is to say, promises
in a plea agreement are permissible promises because they are
made pursuant to law, whereas ordinary promises are impermissi-
ble because they have no foundation in law.
The legalistic baseline likewise helps to explain the prevailing
disconnect between the Courts conception of voluntariness as it
applies, alternatively, to plea bargains and confessions produced by
interrogation. As indicated, in the plea bargaining context, the
Court has tolerated wholesale the persuasion implicit in the lawful
charge, but, in the confession context, the Court has more actively
regulated the kinds of psychological or physical force permitted in
stationhouse interrogations. A court will invalidate a confession
when it is the product of sustained pressure by the police such
84. Parker, 397 U.S. at 802 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Cf. Cheyney C. Ryan, The Normative Concept of Coercion, 89 MIND 481, 482 (1980)
(Definitions of coercion are typically terse. Coercion is the activity of causing someone to do
something against his will, or of bringing about his doing what he does against his will,
writes Virginia Held.); Westen, supra note 43, at 542-43 (discussing the manner by which the
concepts of coercion and freedom are open texture[d] ... less than fully specified and ...
capable of further specification).
86. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750; see also WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 134 (Here the
[Bordenkircher] Court implies that although bargained guilty pleas may be coercive in some
sense ... such pleas are not wrong in the ... constitutional sense.).
87. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (emphasis added).
88. Cf. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 14 (1978)
(criticizing this provision of Rule 11 and explaining, [o]f course, the plea agreement is the
source of the coercion and already embodies the involuntariness).
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that it does not issue from a free choice.89 This test considers the
totality of the circumstances because there are no hard and clear
rules to apply.90
Again, consider the defendant in Brady. Undoubtedly, he felt
pressure.91 He accurately took the States message to be: If you do
not plead, we may kill you.92 But the Court did not get to that
question.93 From its legalistic baseline, it pivoted to a constitutional
analysis rooted in fully informed bargaining. Accordingly, the Court
made much of the fact that the defendant was fully aware of his
circumstances.94 Considerations of compulsion thereby gave way to
considerations of irrationality: rather than take seriously the defen-
dants claim that he was gripped by fear of the death penalty, the
Court evaluated only whether the defendant was competent to ra-
tionally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advan-
tages of pleading guilty.95 In subsequent cases, the Court would
continue to rely upon such rhetoricwhether the defendants coun-
sel had correctly appraised the defendants situation;96 whether
the defendant had made an intelligent choice among the alterna-
tive courses of action;97 whether the prosecutor had act[ed]
89. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949); see also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,
542-43 (1897) (holding that a confession may not be obtained by any direct or implied prom-
ises, however slight); Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1150 & n.73.
90. As I explained previously: For the Court, it matters terrifically that prosecutors apply
pressure with the law, not with their hands. Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1,
at 1151.
91. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 744; see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1912 (Defen-
dants accept bargains because of the threat of much harsher penalties after trial.).
92. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 62, at 58 (A more coercive threat than the death penalty
does not readily come to mind. (quoting James F. Parker, Plea Bargaining, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L.
187, 200 (1972))).
93. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748-50; Alschuler, supra note 62, at 58 (In Brady, the Supreme
Court assumed that the defendants guilty plea had been induced by the governments threat
of a death sentence, and words must mean very little to a Court that could describe such a
guilty plea as voluntary.).
94. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct conse-
quences ... must stand.) (citation omitted); see also Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511
(1984) (Respondent was fully aware of the likely consequences when he pleaded guilty, and,
thus, it was not unfair to expect him to live with those consequences).
95. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added).
96. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
97. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 365 (1978) ([T]he course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor ..., which no more
than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or
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forthrightly in his dealings;98 or, conversely, whether he had en-
gaged in unhealthy subterfuge99 or governmental deception.100
Ultimately, then, the defendant retains no substantive right
against overwhelming force, just a set of procedural rights designed
to ensure that he adequately feels the States exercise of force.101
Notably, that force may be tremendous, not only because the prose-
cutors plea bargaining authority is coextensive with her charging
authority, but also because the prosecutor typically has plenty of
charges from which to choose.102
II. TRIAL PENALTIES
Padilla v. Kentucky marked a sea change in the Courts consti-
tutional approach to plea bargaining.103 At first blush, the decision
had little to do with coercion. The Court merely expanded a defen-
dants constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during
the negotiation and guilty plea stages.104 But, as Stephanos Bibas
foresaw, Padillas significance ran deeper:
Padilla is the Courts first case to treat plea bargaining as a
subject worthy of constitutional regulation in its own right and
facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the Due Process
Clause.).
98. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365.
99. Id.
100. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 (1984) (holding a plea constitutional when it was
in no sense the product of governmental deception). Indeed, the Court has even reversed
plea convictions that entailed lesser forms of surprise. For instance, in Santobello v. New
York, the Court invalidated a negotiated sentence when the prosecutor only inadvertently
failed to fulfill a promise to make no sentencing recommendation. 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
The plea was constitutionally infirm not because the defendant had faced a coercive threat,
but only because the State did not keep its end of the bargain. See id. at 262 ([W]hen a plea
rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.). In such
circumstances, the plea benefits were rendered illusory.
101. See Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1151 ([B]argaining counsel
serves less as a buffer against state power and more as a lens to draw the states power into
sharp focus.); id. at 1149 ([O]ne partys superior ability to turn the bargaining screws is of
far less significance than the other partys ability ... to recognize that fact.).
102. See Bowers, supra note 32, at 1000 n.54; infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text
(discussing overcriminalization and overpunishment).
103. See 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
104. See id. at 373-74.
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on its own terms. By heeding plea-bargaining realities and e-
volving professional norms, the ... majority began to drag the law
into the twenty-first century.... Padilla represents the eclipse of
... eighteenth-century formalism in criminal procedure ... and the
emergence of ... pragmatism.105
In short, the Court took note of conditions on the ground and reori-
ented its focus accordinglyaway from the jury trial and toward the
plea bargain.
Three years later, the Court revisited the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel at plea in Lafler v. Cooper106 and Missouri v.
Frye.107 In these cases, the Court considered for the first time
whether a defendant had a right to effective assistance of counsel
with respect to plea offers not taken.108 In Frye, the lawyer failed to
tell his client of two formal offers, and the defendant ultimately
accepted a much worse deal.109 In Lafler, the lawyer advised his cli-
ent to reject a manifestly good offer, and the defendant ultimately
was convicted after a jury trial and was sentenced to a much longer
term.110
A. Plea Bargainings New Predictive Baseline
For our purposes, we need not linger long on precisely what is or
is not ineffective assistance of counsel post-Lafler and Frye. The
cases are just as important for what they say about the criminal
justice system and plea bargainings paramount place within it. In
a particularly striking passage, the Court acknowledged that the
practice today is not some adjunct to a criminal justice system; it
is the criminal justice system.111 The Court thereby reset the
105. Bibas, supra note 59, at 1120 (emphasis added); see also id. ([A] solid majority of the
Court at last sees that plea bargaining is the norm.).
106. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
107. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
108. See Nancy J. King, Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 29, 29 (2012),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/lafler-v-cooper-and-aedpa [https://perma.cc/VPU3-JU
5B].
109. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
110. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
111. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1912 (describing
the criminal justice system as a system of horse trading between prosecutor and defense
counsel [to] determine[] who goes to jail and for how long) (original alteration omitted)); see
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predictive baseline, at least conceptually. That is, the Court rejected
any notion that the post-trial sentence is the expected punish-
ment.112 To the contrary, the Court recognized that the plea negotia-
tion is the critical point in almost all criminal cases.113
From this starting point (or baseline, if you will), the Court could
readily conclude that the constitutional harm is the loss of the plea
opportunity to access a market-rate bargain, and, in turn, that even
a reliable trial cannot immunize a defendant against such
injury.114 To the contrary, the trial may even be described as the
source of that injury, foreclosing the negotiated sentence that
otherwise would have been imposed in the ordinary course.115 This
phrasein the ordinary courseis crucial to our understanding
of the Courts approach. And it is a phrase to which the Court re-
turned repeatedly.116 As compared to the ordinary coursedefined
by the practice of plea bargainingthe trial sentence may be
understood as an exceptional threat. According to the Court: It is
like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer
would view full price as the norm and anything less a bargain.117 In
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397; Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1154 ([T]he Court
signaled that a plea-bargain is the expected mode of disposition.); Jenny Roberts, Effective
Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2663 (2013) ([T]he Courts recent plea juris-
prudence is firmly grounded in the reality of the central role plea bargaining plays in the
criminal justice system.).
112. See, e.g., Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
113. Id.
114. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387-88.
115. Id. at 1386-87 (observing that the trial caused the injury from the error). 
116. In Lafler, the Court observed that deficient counsel had caused the defendant to lose
benefits he would have received in the ordinary course. Id. at 1388 (emphasis added). And
elsewhere the Court explained that [t]he favorable sentence that eluded the defendant in the
criminal proceeding appears to be the sentence he or others in his position would have re-
ceived in the ordinary course, absent the failings of counsel. Id. at 1387 (emphasis added).
117. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bibas, supra note 59, at 1138). Worse than the sticker
price for cars, the trial price is not even apparent. As trials become rare commodities, prospec-
tive trial sentences grow muddier and less predictable in turn. Nationally, trial rates hover
just above 5 percent. MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE [DOJ], NCJ 208910, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED
FELONS,2002:STATISTICALTABLEStbl.4.2 (2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scscf02.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4US-HFQK]; see Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the Bazaar
of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-
hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html?[https://perma.cc/A2MB-K2HH]. In inferior
criminal courts, the rates are even lower. Personally, I practiced in front of one criminal-court
judge who would commonly open the initial appearance on misdemeanor cases with the query:
Whats the disposition? The point is that the judge anticipated nothing but a summary,
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other words, the Court has recognized the plea bargain as the pre-
dictive baseline. And it is against this baseline that coercion might
be tested.
B. Plea Bargainings New Normative Baseline
The fictive predictive trial baseline has probably never done
much more than rhetorical work for the Court. To the contrary, the
legalistic baseline more readily describes the doctrine, as I have
indicated already.118 By way of reminder, the notion is that the
prosecutor is entitled to file any charge for which she has probable
cause.119 And because the prosecutor operates within her lawful
authority when she files a legally valid charge, she does not coerce
a defendant by proposing a plea to avoid the charge or attendant
trial sentence.120 The question, then, is whether the Court in Lafler
and Frye may have unsettled this normative baseline just as it
unsettled the fictive predictive baseline. I believe it has. Admittedly,
the logic is subtler here. But I am not the only one to see itin dis-
sent, Justice Scalia made much of this jurisprudential shift.121
Justice Scalia immediately recognized what it meant for the
Court to declare that a defendant had suffered a constitutionally re-
mediable injury from the loss of the plea opportunity to avoid a
statutorily prescribed trial sentence.122 Justice Scalia explained that
the Court had to have discovered at least a limited constitutional
entitlement to plea-bargainspecifically, an entitlement that kicks
in the moment the prosecutor proposes a plea.123 To put it another
way, we now may have two competing entitlements: first, the prose-
negotiated guilty plea, and it was not always obvious what he might do at trial if he did not
get one. Of course, much more frequent trials might overwhelm the system and become slap-
dash and likewise unpredictable, but that concern is beyond the scope of this Article. On the
disappearing or even nonexistent shadow of criminal trials, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Laws Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
118. See supra Part I.C.
119. See supra notes 64, 73 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
121. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Alschuler, supra note
59, at 685 ([The] majority opinion in Lafler rejects the assumption that post-trial sentences
are the appropriate ethical baseline.).
122. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1397-98.
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cutors entitlement to file a charge and use it for purposes of
negotiation or trial, and second, the defendants entitlement to effec-
tive assistance by a lawyer who is sometimes obligated to bargain
out from under pending or threatened trial charges and sentences.
At least conceptually, it is no longer apparent which of these
entitlements should establish the operative legalistic baseline.
But the significance of the jurisprudence is more profound still.
It may be fair to say that the Court has reconceived the nature of
criminal law itself. When the Court dubbed the criminal justice
system a system of pleas, not a system of trials,124 it swapped out
legislated code law for what I have called party-driven practice
law125 (and what Justice Scalia called plea-bargaining law).126
Previously, code law had served as the exclusive foundation for the
Courts legalistic normative baseline. But, after Lafler and Frye,
code law is just the starting point or sticker price.127 On this
reading, code law exists on the books for bargaining purposes. It is
subservientor at least secondaryto practice law, whereas
practice law is the real lawthe law in operation, or the law in the
ordinary course.128
Moreover, we may even argue that because the prosecutors enti-
tlement is now grounded in only a subservient form of law, it is a
comparatively diminished entitlement. Indeed, this is precisely
what so bothered Justice Scalia. For him, the law is the law,
whereas plea-bargaining law undermines the legality principle.129
For my part, I am not so troubled.130 But, for now, my normative
124. Id. at 1388 (majority opinion).
125. Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1154, 1159 ([T]he measure of what
the defendant would have received in the ordinary course depends upon some evaluation of
local practice.).
126. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1388 (majority opinion) (quoting Bibas, supra note 59, at 1138).
128. See id. at 1387-88 (concluding that plea bargaining is not outside the law); see also
Bowers, supra note 69, at 127 (observing that code law is not real law; it is a kind of raw
material or proto-law from which real law is manufactured); Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel,
supra note 1, at 1154 ([A] bargain is more than just consistent with law; it is law.). 
129. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. 1397 ([T]he law is the
law, and those who break it should pay the penalty provided.... Today, however, the Supreme
Court of the United States elevates plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional
entitlement.) (emphasis added).
130. See Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1155 ([T]hough Justice Scalia
may have the better end of the argument descriptively, I do not agree that plea-bargaining
by virtue of its extralegal statusought also to fall beyond constitutional regulation. To the
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defense of practice law can wait.131 For present purposes, my point
is only that Justice Scalia had the better end of the descriptive de-
bate. The Court has recognized a constitutional plea bargaining
entitlement that is at least somewhat unmoored from code law.132 I
previously dubbed this newfound constitutional entitlement a right
to extralegal counsel,133 and I explained that, in addition to legal
acumen, it depends on expertise in courthouse custom and prac-
tice.134 More to the point, the entitlement may be accurately de-
scribed as extralegalistic because it entails creative bargaining
that is designed to circumvent legally permissible trial charges and
sentences.135 Rather than the trial, the bargain provides the back-
stopthe practice law baseline.136 This was the message behind the
Courts assertion that the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than
the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a
defendant.137
Once we have reconceptualized plea bargaining as an entitle-
ment, it becomes all the more difficult to conceive of the negotiated
sentence as a benefitas only an exercise of sovereign grace. By
comparison, as the significance of the trial sentence diminishes em-
pirically and legalistically, that punishment comes to assume the
character of a penaltya deviation from the practice law baseline.138
contrary, the Courts decisions reflect a welcome recognition that ... plea-bargaining ...
demands constitutional regulation.) (footnote omitted). 
131. See infra Part III.
132. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ([T]he Court today opens a whole
new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.); see also Bowers,
Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1153 (The Court had to have determined that the
bargain standing alone has some constitutional significance after all.); Roberts, supra note
111, at 2664 (explaining that it logically follows from the Courts decisions in Lafler and Frye
that there is a right to effective bargaining counsel).
133. Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1, at 1133 (The right to legal counsel ap-
plies principally to the formal domain of the criminal trial; the right to extralegal counsel
applies exclusively to the comparatively unstructured domains of the plea-bargain and guilty
plea.).
134. See id. at 1133-34, 1157.
135. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2010) (approving of creative bargain-
ing to circumvent mandatory sentencing and so-called collateral consequences).
136. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (describing a fair trial as an insufficient backstop for
a missed plea offer).
137. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
138. Of course, the Court would reject this reading. It would claim, as it did in Lafler, that
there remains no constitutional right to plea bargain. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1395 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977)); cf. Mabry v. Johnson,
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C. Plea Bargainings Burgeoning Proportionality Baseline 
What is the aim of practice law? What do the parties intend to do
with it? Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges have many plea
bargaining objectivesdefensible or otherwise.139 But we may hope
that they are driven most by the desire to achieve proportionality (or
at least some other defensible purpose of punishment, like deter-
rence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation).
It is tempting to respond, then, that the aims of practice law and
code law are aligned. That is to say, we may hope also that code law
is concerned principally with proportionality. But code law and prac-
tice law take different perspectives on questions of desert. Code law
defines proportionality legalistically, whereas practice law pursues
a richer conception, which I have called normative guilt.140 Of
course, there is no magical gauge with which to measure normative
guilt.141 Moreover, we must acknowledge that it matters terrifically
who is doing the measuring. After all, we are not talking about
normative guilt in the transcendental sense. Rather, we are talking
about the parties perceptions of proportionalitytheir practical
conceptions of desert.
467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984) (A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional sig-
nificance.... It is [only] the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution.). But the
claim is false. All the Court could mean is that the defendant has no right to receive a plea
proposal in the first instance. The prosecutor must trigger the entitlement by making a plea
proposal (which, of course, she has already done in any case in which the question of plea
bargaining coercion comes into play).
139. On the incentives of the parties to plea bargain, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense
Attorneys Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1974); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutors Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Trial Judges Role in Plea Bargaining, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Josh Bowers, Manda-
tory Life and the Death of Equitable Discretion, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICAS NEW
DEATH PENALTY? 25 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) [hereinafter Bowers,
Mandatory Life]; Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1117-18,
1139-42 (2008) [hereinafter Bowers, Punishing the Innocent].
140. Bowers, supra note 69, at 128 (Code law is concerned with only legal guilt and tech-
nically accurate convictions. Practice law is concerned with normative guilt, instrumental
crime control, and fair sentence length.). See generally Bowers, supra note 73. The difference
between these two perspectives on proportionality is akin to the distinction sometimes drawn
between broad and narrow culpability (where broad culpability refers to morality and
narrow culpability to legality). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW § 10.02[B] (6th ed. 2012); Douglas N. Husak, Broad Culpability and the Retributivists
Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449 (2012).
141. See generally Bowers, supra note 73.
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Consider, for a moment, the justice-minded prosecutor. She may
be eager to give the defendant no more than the punishment she
believes he deserves. But the prosecutors perception of proportion-
ality may be wrong.142 Here, effective assistance of counsel can help.
The defense attorney may be more or less successful at persuading
the prosecutor to rethink the question, but we still cannot be con-
vinced that practice law will hit its mark (though we may have
reason to hope that it may get close). Ultimately, we are left with a
perception of proportionality developed by one set of stakeholders:
the parties to the bargainin particular, the prosecutor.143
This account is not entirely pessimistic. An added worry, how-
everbeyond the possibility that the parties may misconstrue
normative guiltis that the perceived equitable sentence is avail-
able only to the defendant who waives his trial rights.144 This
problem is intrinsic to almost any plea bargaining system, and I do
not wish to linger long on the criticism. I intend only to make plain
that, by comparison to the negotiated sentence, the often-mandatory
code law sentence is widely considered disproportionate, even by the
prosecutor who may pursue the high charge only to achieve the in-
strumental end of cooperation and quick plea.145
Consider the unhappy case of Clarence Aaron.146 He was a prom-
ising student athlete sentenced to three terms of life without parole
for a relatively minor role in a sizable drug deal.147 Even the prose-
142. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared
Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
211, 246 (2012) (Perceptions ... of ... empirical desert ... may be wrong.... [T]here may be
moral truth ... but popular perceptions of fairness and justice may be otherwise.).
143. See Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2563 (Prosecutors can credibly threaten ... punish-
ments in order to induce plea bargains at the customary price ... fixed by the prosecutors
themselves.).
144. See Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 139, at 38 (The defendant must either bar-
gain for an individualized sentence or forfeit equitable evaluation in exchange for the exercise
of trial rights.).
145. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 69, at 128 (describing the plea bargain as an opportunity
for a defendant to avoid a sentence that is often much worse than what the defendant norma-
tively deserves).
146. See generally Transcript of Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast Jan. 12, 1999),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/etc/script.html [https://perma.cc/2NE3-
BYUA].
147. See id.; Jennifer Lawinski, Locked up for Life, Part One: The Case of Clarence Aaron,
FOXNEWS (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/12/04/locked-up-for-life-part-one-
case-clarence-aaron.html [https://perma.cc/2M8Y-J8DV].
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cutor agreed that Aaron had received an undeservedly harsh
penalty.148 But, because he was either unable or unwilling to play
ball, Aaron was denied the practice law pricean average of eight
years in prison for each of his codefendants.149 According to the
prosecutor:
He thought he was going to win and he was given every opportu-
nity to help himself early on and he didnt want to do it.... These
other people were perhaps guiltier or more culpable [but he] ...
suffered ... the consequences of the arrogance of thinking that
youre going to beat this, that Im too good to take a deal.150
The prosecutor was not opposed to what he perceived to be a pro-
portionate term of years, but the defendant had to pick which
horse he would ride.151 The defendant could have accepted the sen-
tence that the prosecutor had considered proportionate, or he could
have fought on under the genuine threat of a sentence that everyone
agreed was draconian.152
How do we know, however, that Clarence Aarons trial sentence
was draconian? After all, if perceptions are not transcendental
truth,153 is it not at least possible that the available practice law
sentence of eight years in prison might have been too lenient and his
trial sentence of life without parole was, in fact, comparatively
proportionate? We cannot know for certain, but I think that our
intuitions tell us otherwise (and, more to the point, that our intui-
tions are right). First, the obvious political reality is that Americans
would not tolerate underpunishing more than 95 percent of
convicted defendants.154 Second, consider another set of familiar
148. See Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 139, at 38; cf. Stuntz, supra note 117, at 2563
([P]rosecutors [may] threaten the death penalty in cases in which they have no desire to
impose it, as a means of getting better plea bargains.).
149. Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 139, at 38.
150. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting former United States Attorney J. Don Foster).
151. Id. (explaining that, pursuant to mandatory sentencing statutes, legislators have pre-
scribed a punishment that only interested prosecutors can temper but that prosecutors have
the least interest in tempering for reasons of equitable justice alone). 
152. See id. ([T]he defendant must submit to whatever sentence the prosecutor deems
equitably (or otherwise) appropriate or face a trial.).
153. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
154. See Alschuler, supra note 59, at 701, 704 (Do you suppose that judges ... now sentence
95% of all offenders less severely than they deserve? ... When a legislature plans from the
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statistics: America has almost 5 percent of the worlds population
but nearly 25 percent of its incarcerated population;155 over two
million people are currently warehoused in Americas jails and
prisons;156 and almost seven million Americans live under some
kind of criminal justice supervision.157 I suppose it is conceivable
that these are the numbers of a proportionateand highly effi-
cientcriminal justice system. But they more likely represent a
disproportionately harshbut still quite efficientsystem. It would
seem to be entirely far-fetched, however, to claim that these figures
describe a lenient system. And, if our system of pleas is at best a
system of proportionate pleas (and it is probably not even that), then
trial sentences must be disproportionately harsh by comparison.
Still, I freely admit that there is no definitive way to resolve our
uncertainty about what may constitute a proportionate penalty for
a given offense. It brings to mind Paul Robinsons familiar distinc-
tion between empirical desert and deontological desert.158 To
discover empirical desert, Robinson explained that we use the
tools of social science to reveal what people perceive and believe.159
Comparatively, to discover deontological desert, we use the tools
of moral philosophy to strive for transcendental truth.160 With
outset to allow 95% of all offenders to avoid the punishments it prescribes, these [trial] pun-
ishments do not establish a moral norm.); see also DUROSE & LANGAN, supra note 117, at
tbl.4.2 (noting that 95 percent of criminal convictions are products of guilty pleas).
155. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Does the United States Really Have 5 Percent of the Worlds




156. Ezra Klein & Evan Soltas, Wonkbook: 11 Facts About Americas Prison Population,
WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/13/
wonkbook-11-facts-about-americas-prison-population/ [https://perma.cc/8T65-SUX6].
157. ERIC LOTKE & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., TIPPING POINT: MARYLANDS
OVERUSE OF INCARCERATION AND THE IMPACT ON PUBLIC SAFETY 3 (2005), http://www.justice
policy.org/images/upload/05-03_REP_MDTippingPoint_AC-MD.pdf [https://perma.cc/A37W-
RJTR] (citing LAUREN E. GLAZE & SERI PALLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DOJ, NCJ
210676, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004, at 1 (2005), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ppus04.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S44-GSQP]).
158. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2007); see also Bowers & Robinson, supra
note 142, at 216-17.
159. See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 142, at 233-34.
160. See Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between
Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2007).
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practice law we have something like empirical desert, but not quite.
We are not relying upon laboratory experiments to reveal laypeo-
ples intuitions. Rather, we are relying upon a natural, ongoing
experimentcriminal justice in actionto reveal prevailing
adjudicative practices and preferences. The process is bottom-up.
Institutional actors on the ground operate according to their own
retributive viewpoints and beliefs, designing the practices that
constitute real law.
The process may be bottom-up, but the top has taken notice. The
Court is no longer wed to the conceit that the trial sentence is the
deserved sentence. In this way, the Court has done more than just
prioritize practice law; it has prioritized what practice law gener-
atesits particular conception of proportionality. Look no further
than the Courts description of trial penalties as longer sentences
than defendants deservesentences that exist on the books largely
for bargaining purposes.161 For the Court, the trial sentence is not
just an atypical sentence; it is an atypically harsh sentence. In
contemporary criminal justice, it is often the case that no one wants
to see the trial sentence imposed. Even legislators expect and intend
prosecutors to use their discretion to soften code law.162
With the recognition that code law should not be taken too
seriously, the Court has also come to acknowledge the practical con-
sequences of overcriminalization and excessive punishment163
though it has continued to refuse to reckon with those consequences
constitutionally. As Bill Stuntz demonstrated, political and insti-
tutional expediency motivate legislators to criminalize too much
conduct too harshly.164 And, for its part, the Court has almost
161. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Rachel E. Barkow, Separation
of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)).
162. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1963 (explaining that the legislature often does
not intend for the statute to be applied to every offender who might fall within its terms, but
instead relies on prosecutors to exercise their discretion not to pursue habitual criminal
sentencing for offenders who [fall] within the statute but seem[] not to deserve such harsh
treatment).
163. See id. at 1965 ([W]here the legislature drafts broad criminal statutes and then at-
taches mandatory sentences to those statutes, prosecutors have an unchecked opportunity to
overcharge and generate easy pleas.); see also Bowers, supra note 32, at 989-91, 996; Erik
Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 716 (2005) (depicting
overcriminalization as the abuse of the supreme force of a criminal justice systemthe
implementation of crimes or imposition of sentences without justification).
164. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
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categorically refused to check what Stuntz famously called the
pathological politics of criminal law.165 As I observed previously,
the Court has left almost unfettered the legislatures authority to
criminalize conduct and to prescribe disproportionately harsh pun-
ishments, and the prosecutors consequent authority to stack counts
and to overcharge inequitably.166 But now the Court has come at
least to appreciate and promote the back-end safety valve of equita-
ble plea bargaininga practice law mechanism designed to produce
sentences perceived to be consistent with the sound administration
of criminal justice.167 The parties use their perceptions of propor-
tionality as the building blocks of practice lawthe building blocks
505, 510 (2001).
165. Id. at 505. Consider the Courts observation in Whren v. United States:
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code
of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can
no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even
if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or
what right) we would decide ... which particular provisions are sufficiently im-
portant to merit enforcement.
517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996); accord United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 126 (1979); see,
e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (upholding a habitual-offender sentence
of twenty-five years to life for theft of three golf clubs); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77
(2003) (same for theft of five videotapes); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990, 996 (1991)
(upholding sentence of life without parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine); see also
Abrams, supra note 38, at 163 ([T]he Supreme Court has ruled that if a legislature wants to
send a petty recidivist to prison for life, neither the eighth amendments prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment nor any other part of the Constitution stands in the way.); Bowers,
supra note 69, at 126 ([T]he Court has adopted a tone of almost cheerful resignation, as if it
were helplessas opposed to merely unwillingto constitutionally check the overinflated
criminal codes.... The substantive law is what legislatures have made it and what the Court
has permitted it to become.). More recently, Justice Kagan made the point explicitly in a case
purportedly about statutory construction:
[T]he real issue [is] overcriminalization and excessive punishment....
.... [This statute] is a bad lawtoo broad and undifferentiated, with too-high
maximum penalties, which give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers
too much discretion. And ... [it] is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem
of a deeper pathology in the federal criminal code.
But whatever the wisdom or folly of [a statute], this Court does not get to re-
write the law.... If judges disagree with [the legislative] choice, we are perfectly
entitled to say soin lectures, in law review articles, and even in dicta. But we
are not entitled to replace the statute.
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1100 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
166. Bowers, supra note 69, at 126 ([O]verinflated criminal codes ... have enabled
prosecutors to turn bargaining screws and ... to decide which defendant gets what discount
and why.).
167. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012).
2016] PLEA BARGAININGS BASELINES 1113
of an emerging proportionality baseline. And it is against this
baseline that draconian trial threats are made.
By tacitly endorsing this sentiment, the Court arguably has
revisited a coercion theory that it had squarely rejected previously.
As Justice Powell articulated in an early plea bargaining dissent, a
plea proposal may be coercive when it threatens to penalize a
defendant with a trial sentence of unique severity.168 The Court
seems to have circled back to this idea that severity, and not just
legality, may matter.
This is, in fact, what so vexed Justice Scaliathat a statutorily
valid sentence could somehow still be constitutionally suspect.169
Justice Scalias position relies upon the notion that validity abso-
lutely equals legality. As I explain in the next Part, that is an
increasingly difficult proposition to maintain in our system of
outsized codes and excessive punishments.170
III. SOME TENTATIVE THOUGHTS ON A JURISPRUDENCE OF
PROPORTIONALITY
I do not mean to overstate the degree to which the Court has
reconceptualized proportionality as permissibility. As I mentioned,
it has done so by implication only. The issue in Lafler and Frye was
only whether the defense attorney had fought hard enough for a fair
enough bargain. The issue was not coercion, much less proportional-
itys relationship to it. Nor do I expect the Court to revisit the
question any time soon.171
168. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 373 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 807 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Stephanos Bibas and Gerard Lynch have taken issue with the outmoded and fictive
legalistic perspective that the sentencing outcomes after trial are in fact just. Gerard E.
Lynch, Frye and Cooper: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 40-41 (2012), http://
yalelawjournal.org/forum/frye-and-lafler-no-big-deal [https://perma.cc/5RVU-ZKPU] (criticiz-
ing Scalia); see also Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 35,
37 (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/taming-negotiated-justice [https://perma.cc/
U738-45HE] (The other flaw in Justice Scalias [Padilla] dissent is his assumption that
nothing matters except for factual guilt, so no defendant can complain if he or she gets a
longer sentence anywhere within the broad statutory range.).
171. See Berman, supra note 19, at 98 n.414 ([W]hether plea bargaining [generally] consti-
tutes coercion ... I put ... aside because the Supreme Court has already determined that it is
constitutionally permissible.... Perhaps it should be otherwise. But to think that it may be
1114 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1083
Before presenting a prescription for this issue, I first emphasize
brieflyand at the risk of overkillwhy I believe a proportionality
baseline is prudent, at least as a supplement to the conventional
legalistic baseline.
A. Legality All the Way Down
I have devoted considerable space in other articles and essays to
cataloguing the criminal justice systems exceptionalalmost ana-
chronisticfidelity to the principle of legality.172 This fidelity results
in a fervent, systemic affinity for bright-line rules.173
Bright-line rules have their place, but, as I have argued else-
where, we may have gone too far.174 The pendulum has swung
radically from a historically unstructured approach to criminal law
and procedure to a rigid formalism.175 It is a formalism that does
more to empower police and prosecutors than to constrain them.
Our bright-line rules end up describing safe harbors within which
otherwise within the lifetime of anyone reading this Article is, I think, fanciful.).
172. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 32, at 1021; see also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 44-47 (2d ed. 2008); Egon Bittner, The
Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 699, 700 (1967) (noting that
crime belongs wholly to the law, and its treatment is exhaustively based on considerations
of legality); Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 256 (1987) (discussing the especial need for certainty in
criminal law) (internal quotation marks omitted); Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Inter-
section: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 97 (1996) (The law of crime is special.); Kenneth I. Winston, On
Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39 (1974) (discussing criminal laws long
tradition of strict adherence to rules). 
173. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (In determining what is reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment, we have given great weight to ... the need for a bright-line
constitutional standard.); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment,
45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 260 (1984); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 888
(2009) (Fourth Amendment doctrine is replete with rule-like presumptions of reasonableness
for generically defined fact patterns.). 
174. See Bowers, supra note 73 (charging discretion); Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note
139, at 26 (mandatory sentences); Bowers, supra note 32, at 1031, 1050 (Fourth Amendment);
Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319,
324 (2012) [hereinafter Bowers, Normative Grand Juries] (the authority of grand juries); see
also Seidman, supra note 172, at 98, 103, 122, 160 (noting that although realisms lessons
for criminal law seem obvious, formalism continues to dominate criminal jurisprudence, and
terming old fashioned this formalist world view).
175. See Bowers, supra note 32, at 1007 n.87.
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police and prosecutors exercise tremendous discretion over whether
and when to act, and against whom.176 In this way, the prevailing
conception of legality has failed in its principal objective, which is
to minimize arbitrary exercises of state power.177
But what do these bright-line rules have to do with the practice
of plea bargaining? Discretion is desirable but dangerous. We pre-
tend to deny it, but we cannot do without it.178 Thus, we adopt hard
rules that operate not to eliminate discretion, but merely to shunt
its exercise underground and into the hands of the systems least
transparent and accountable institutional actors. For instance,
determinate sentencing laws, like habitual-offender laws and other
mandatory-minimum statutes, serve to strip judges of sentencing
discretion only by delivering it to prosecutors at the point of charge
and bargain.179
But there is much more going on than just that. Because legisla-
tors have powerful incentives to overcriminalize, and the Court, as
I explained, has done very little to limit the reach and severity of
criminal codes, police and prosecutors have no shortage of prospec-
tive charges with which to arrest and charge.180 In such a world,
176. See id. at 995; Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, Subjective and Objective Discretion
of Prosecutors, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 673, 673 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009)
(The law sets outer boundaries, but any administrative choice that falls within those bound-
aries is something distinct from lawcall it discretionbecause there is no law to apply.).
177. See infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of legality and
the rule of law).
178. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS,DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 19 (1969)
(Rules must be supplemented with discretion.... For many circumstances the mechanical
application of a rule means injustice; what is needed is individualized justice ... tailored to the
needs of the individual case.); MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISION
MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 51 (2d ed.
1988) ([I]ndividualized judgment, taking account of the immediate circumstances of the
behavior in question, is a necessary component of just decision making.); MORTIMER R.
KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES
FROM LEGAL RULES 75 (1973) (arguing executive exercises of equitable discretion are widely
regarded by responsible sources as both inevitable and desirable); Bowers, supra note 73, at
1664; Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual
Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 928 (1960) (Unbending rules rigidly administered may
not merely fail to do justice, they may do positive injustice.); R. George Wright, Dreams and
Formulas: The Roles of Particularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195,
214 (2008) (noting that law, without equity, can become insensitive, mechanical, morally
blind, or rule fetishist (footnotes omitted)).
179. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 148, 151 (1996); Bowers, Mandatory Life,
supra note 139, at 41-42.
180. See Bowers, supra note 32, at 1003, 1029, 1036.
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legal guilt becomes less important than normative guilt. Between
four legally guilty offenders, one is set free, another charged with a
misdemeanor, a third with a felony, and a fourth with a third strike,
which, upon conviction, mandates a life sentence. And between four
other legally guilty offenders, each of whom is allowed to plead out
from under third strikes, one gets two years in prison, another five,
a third goes away for ten, and a fourth receives twenty-five. In these
examples, the prosecutors charging and bargaining decisions are
monumentally important, but they have very little to do with legal
guilt. The prosecutor may justify the consequent sentencing differ-
ences as appropriate exercises of what I have called equitable
discretion.181 But, critically, she is not required to justify the
differences in the first instance because, pursuant to prevailing con-
stitutional doctrine, she exercises almost sovereign prerogative
over these determinations of normative guilt.182
As I suggested already, equitable discretion is defensibleindeed,
necessary.183 But there are strong reasons to question whether the
prosecutor may exercise it effectively or fairly.184 It is not that she
lacks moral sense, but only that her charging and bargaining deci-
sions are clouded by institutional and cognitive biases of a kind that
do not affect other stakeholders.185 What the system lacks, and what
it desperately needs, are equitable checks on a prosecutors norma-
tive authoritya set of checks with which other institutional actors
would prevent prosecutors from exercising free reign within the safe
harbors described by hard rules.
181. For the purposes of this Article, my conception of equity is consistent with what
Aristotle called epieikeia or fair-mindedness, of which proportionality is a part. See Law-
rence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHIL-
OSOPHY 178, 205 (2003).
182. Sarat & Clarke, supra note 69, at 413 ([T]he rule of law is replete with ... places
where law runs up against sovereign prerogative. In those places, law runs out, law gives way,
law authorizes the exercise of a power that it does not regulate.); see also Bowers, supra note
73, at 1659; Bowers, supra note 32, at 1031-32 (In our criminal justice system, legalistic
constraints on executive discretionto the extent they are required at allare typically no
more than thresholds to permissive state action. That is, they do not mandate state action;
they authorize it.). 
183. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (Our system of criminal
justice necessarily depends on conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers. (quoting
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913))); supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text
(discussing the danger and desirability of discretion).
184. See Bowers, supra note 73, at 1660.
185. See id.
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For present purposes, we may recast the debate in terms of per-
missibility. The current systemic approach to legality generates a
cramped conception of permissibility defined as technical guilt
accuracy only. First, courts do not ask whether criminal codes are
too expansive or harsh, but only whether statutes are precise
enough.186 In other words, precise enough criminal laws are permis-
sible criminal laws. Second, courts do not ask whether arrests and
chargesmade and filed pursuant to these codesare generally
unreasonable, but only whether there is probable cause to believe
that suspects and defendants are legally guilty of the offenses.187 In
other words, criminal charges supported by probable cause are per-
missible criminal charges. Third, courts do not ask whether plea
bargains are genuinely coercive, but only whether, again, the
underlying charges are permissible criminal charges.188 In other
words, permissible criminal charges generate permissible plea
bargains. Fourth, courts do not ask whether negotiated sentences
or, conversely, often mandatory trial sentences are disproportionate
or otherwise unfair, but only whether the underlying convictions are
based upon permissible guilty pleas or trial proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.189 That is, permissible plea bargains (or proof of legal
guilt) produce permissible punishment.
From start to finish, the criminal process is designed to punish
legally guilty offenders without any consideration of whether, in a
particular case, it ought to do so. The jurisprudential tie that binds
all stages of the process is the same sterile, technocratic, and over-
played notion that the legality principle cannot be polluted by
equitable oversight. Because we find the same thread winding
through all stages, no stage operates independently of the others.
That is, we cannot adequately consider the prosecutors bargaining
power without also considering bright-line criminalization, charge,
trial, and sentencing rules.
But, happily, because each interlocking stage influences the
others, we are provided various opportunities for reform. An equit-
186. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); infra notes 211-12
and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); see also Bowers, supra note 32,
at 988-89.
188. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
189. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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able circuitbreaker at one stage may do promising work at
another.190 For instance, I previously have prescribed two different
types of equitable arrest and charging screensone administered
by judges and the other by grand juries.191 With those in place, we
might not also require aggressive regulation of the equities of plea
bargains. But because those are not forthcoming, the need grows for
a proportionality baseline, or at least something other than a coer-
cion test grounded exclusively in legality.192
B. A Proportionality Methodology
I am not the first to envision a proportionality baseline. Most no-
tably, Alan Wertheimer suggested that a prosecutors plea proposal
might be coercive when it threatens an obviously disproportionate
trial sentence:
[I]t may prove easier to think of Bs moral baseline in terms of
the requirements of justice rather than rights .... Whether it was
a coercive proposal [on this reading] ... depends on whether [the
sentence] is an unjust sentence for the offense.... If it is an exces-
sive punishment, the proposal was a threat.193
It is all well and good to talk of excessive punishment. The trick
is to identify it. In truth, there is no definition, as I examined in the
previous Section. My hope here is to demonstrate only that the
judge is particularly well situated to inquireor perhaps it is more
accurate to say that the judge is well situated to sharein the prac-
tice by which the parties negotiate for proportional punishment.194
190. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (discussing the jury as a circuit-
breaker capable of interrupting unwarranted use of the States machinery of justice). 
191. See Bowers, supra note 73, at 1713; Bowers, supra note 32, at 1047; Bowers, Norma-
tive Grand Juries, supra note 174, at 321, 323.
192. Elsewhere in this Issue, Donald Dripps echoes my claim that positive legality should
not provide the exclusive answer to the constitutional question. See Donald A. Dripps, Guilt,
Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2016).
193. WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 218 (emphasis added); see also Alschuler, supra note
59, at 697 (discussing harshness and leniency as deviations from a moral baseline).
194. There is a powerful complaint that equitable checks undermine the rule of law.
Elsewhere, I have responded to this critique in considerable detail. See Bowers, supra note
73, at 1661-62, 1664-73; Bowers, supra note 32, at 1021-25, 1043, 1045-46. I think the debate
is largely beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth mentioning that this sharing of
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At her disposal, the judge possesses not only the conventional tool
of the common law method but also her experience with practice
law.195 She may use these analytic tools to do a bit of social science
and a bit of moral philosophya methodology that may be said to
lie at the midpoint between Paul Robinsons empirical desert and
the moral philosophers deontological desert.196 That is, the judge
may consider both descriptive and normative conceptions of propor-
tionalityprevailing practice as well as moral conviction. 
I am more comfortable, however, with an alternative framing of
the enterprise. In truth, a judge will never be willing or able to thor-
oughly consult social science or moral philosophy. She will make a
softer study of things. Instead of engaging in rigorous empiricism or
deontological analysis, she will reflect on her intuitions and her
experience to discover what, in the ordinary course, tends and ought
to occur. This jurisprudence may be better understood, then, as a
light brand of virtue jurisprudence.
What is virtue jurisprudence? A number of legal scholars and vir-
tue ethicistsmost notably Larry Solumhave developed a theory
of decision making whereby the judge relies upon a combination of
[t]he intellectual virtues of theoretical and practical wisdom and
the moral virtues of courage, temperance, and good temper to
achieve excellence in judging.197 This end goal is to recognize and
equitable authority ameliorates the standard rule-of-law concerns about arbitrary and capri-
cious punishment. See Bowers, supra note 32, at 1042-43 ([A]n [equitable] approach would
not empower executive agents by creating a safe harbor for the authorized exercise of
discretion; rather, it would empower other agents (and even promote consistency) by elimin-
ating such safe harbors.); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83,
93, 96 (1993) (Equity may be regarded as a correcting and completing of legal justice.... [I]t
seems wrong ... [to] suggest[] that we have to choose ... between equity and the rule of law....
[W]hen [rules] ... have manifestly erred, it is justice itself, not a departure from justice, to use
equitys flexible standard.); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L.REV. 1969, 2039
(2008) ([G]iving other decisionmakers discretion promotes consistency, not arbitrariness.
Discretion limits discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and abuse.) (emphasis
added); cf. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 373-74 (1996) (Its when the law falsely denies its evaluative
underpinnings that it is most likely to be incoherent and inconsistent.).
195. See, e.g., Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining, 102 KY.
L.J. 1, 9-10, 14-15 (2013).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 158-60.
197. Solum, supra note 181, at 189; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM.
J. JURIS. 65, 72 (2006).
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express the virtue of justice.198 It is an objective that requires le-
gal vision, which, happily enough, judges possess more so than any
other institutional actor.199 Ultimately, the theory is introspective,
particularistic, and practical.200 The judge critically reflects upon her
situation sense to consider all the circumstances.201 In this way,
she behaves similarly to any individual who pursues a flourishing
human life.202 But whereas a layperson examines life and her
choices about it based on her everyday experiences in the world, the
judge examines law and her choices about it based on her everyday
experiences in the judicial system.203
198. Solum, supra note 197, at 88; cf. Bowers, supra note 73, at 1672 (Complete justice
demands both the simple justice that arises from fair and virtuous treatment and the legal
justice that arises from the application of legal rules.); Nussbaum, supra note 194, at 93
(Aristotle[] ... define[s] equity as a kind of justice, but a kind that is superior to ... strict legal
justice.); Solum, supra note 197, at 99 (distinguishing between two styles of rule application,
... mechanical and sensitive).
199. Solum, supra note 181, at 197; cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An
Historical and Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, lx (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (In a government seeking to advance the public
interest, each organ has a special competence or expertise, and the key to good government
is not just figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out which institutions should be
making which decisions and how all the institutions should interrelate.).
200. See Bowers, supra note 73, at 1674-75, 1691 n.165, 1725-26; Kyron Huigens, The
Jurisprudence of Punishment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793, 1820 (2007) ([D]esert for legal
punishment is informal and particularistic.); Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Crazi-
ness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1492-93 (1984) (explaining that proportionality provides no in-
variant, objective deserved punishment for each offensive act); Nussbaum, supra note 194,
at 92 (describing equity as a gentle art of particular perception, a temper of mind that refuses
to demand retribution without understanding the whole story); see also RICHARD J. BONNIE
ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 13 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that, according to some commentators, one
of the strengths of retributive theory is its sensitivity to contemporary community morality).
See generally JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES 1 (2004) (expressing the strong
particularist account that moral judgment can get along perfectly well without any appeal
to principles).
201. Solum, supra note 181, at 192 (quoting Karl Llewellyn); see Kyron Huigens, Virtue and
Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1467 (1995) (explaining that inculpation has nothing
to do with obeying a rule given by others, but instead requires practical judgment that
enables one to act amid the contingencies of everyday life).
202. Solum, supra note 181, at 189.
203. See id. at 192 (The person of practical wisdom knows which particular ends are worth
pursuing and which means are best suited to achieve those ends. Judicial wisdom is simply
the virtue of practical wisdom as applied to the choices that must be made by judges.). Lon
Fuller called this kind of particularistic evaluation productive thinking, which he defined
as the ability to put aside ready-made solutions and familiar props in favor of decision
making that is free, flexible, and effective. Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REV.
2016] PLEA BARGAININGS BASELINES 1121
But how would virtue jurisprudence apply to the coercion inquiry?
Before we proceed, I should make plain that I am no plea bargaining
abolitionist. To the contrary, I share the view of Bob Scott and Bill
Stuntz that, in a world of overcriminalization, defendants are better
off with plea bargaining than without it.204 Moreover, although I am
skeptical of the prosecutors ability to adequately exercise equitable
discretion free of institutional and cognitive biases, I still believe the
prosecutor is entitled to some amount of influence and deference.
But we may recognize and respect, on the one side, the value of plea
bargaining and prosecutorial competence and, on the other, the need
for judicial oversight.205
With this balance in mind, Scott and Stuntz proposed a plea bar-
gaining presumption of enforceability.206 Only in truly exceptional
circumstances could a judge deviate downward from a negotiated
sentence, a modest measure of substantive regulation designed to
curb plea bargainings worst excesses.207 I might term the presump-
tion a presumption of proportionality. But otherwise, I am largely on
board. The presumption could apply to all legally permissible
prospective trial sentences. In this way, the legality baseline might
still play a primary roleeven a pivotal rolebut not always a
dispositive role.208 A defendant challenging his negotiated or trial
sentence would call upon the judge to consider his punishment in its
context and also to compare it with the sentences levied on other
35, 39 (1950). More to the point, Fuller suggested that the kind of situation most likely to
elicit productive thinking ... [is] the process of adjudication. Id. (I think we can say that not
only does being put in the position of a judge develop the individuals capacity for objective
and creative thought, but that the widespread existence of this capacity ... is itself a precondi-
tion for the successful operation of our judicial system.).
204. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1930-33.
205. See Douglas A. Berman, Mercys Disguise, Prosecutorial Power, and Equalitys Modern
Construction, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 176, at 675, 676 (observing that
executive expertise need not translate to discretion ... free from any judicial scrutiny).
206. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1917 (arguing that plea bargains merit a presump-
tion of enforceability, but also endorsing modest reforms designed, inter alia, to check coer-
cion).
207. See id. at 1931.
208. Perhaps the presumption might be comparable to the presumption of reasonableness
that federal courts apply to judges who sentence within the federal guidelines. See Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007). A federal appellate court presumes that the legally
permissible guidelines sentence is reasonable; a criminal court would presume that the legally
permissible negotiated or trial sentence was proportional. Id. at 347.
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similarly situated defendants.209 Thereafter, the judge would be
required to make findings designed to support the proposition that
the punishment was genuinely excessive.210 Only then might she
conclude that the plea proposal was coercivea threat to impose a
penalty.
But, of course, the question remains what it means for one defen-
dant to be similarly situated to another. Again, the judge would like-
ly start by comparing one legally guilty offender with another, but
I would hope she would not stop there. Once we try to understand
the idea of excessive punishment in virtue ethics terms, we must
recognize that, like any normative concept, its shape depends on a
variety of circumstances.211 The evaluation is influenced by
intuition, practice, and experience. Thus, the judge would do more
than merely calculate statistically whether the defendant received
a punishment much worse than legally similarly situated others
(that is, those with like records who were convicted of the same
offense). The judge also would take into account the particular act
behind the crime, the reasons for it, the defendants circumstances,
and even the prosecutors charging and bargaining behavior.212
Again, we return to the question of permissibility. A fulsome pro-
portionality baselineeven if it were just a supplement to a legal-
istic baselinewould call upon the judge to take a deep dive.213 In
this respect, even the prosecutors charging and bargaining purpose
should sometimes matter to the evaluation. That is to say, it might
bolster a claim of coercion that a prosecutor filed or threatened a
209. See id. at 358-59.
210. See id. at 357-59.
211. Farnsworth, supra note 46, at 340 (discussing the concept of fairness as it relates to
coercion).
212. See Huigens, supra note 201, at 1445 (explaining that the inculpation of another
entails an exercise of practical judgment).
213. Cf. Bowers, supra note 32, at 1023 ([T]he legality principle works best when it
operates as a special formalist supplement to otherwise relevant realist considerations and
not as a special substitute.). Ultimately, this might end up an examination of prosecutorial
motivesa form of judicial oversight that I have previously examined in much more detail.
See id. at 1026-28. Specifically, I proposed that a viable test for the reasonableness of an
arrest would be to ask whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have
made the arrest for the reasons given. Id. at 1028 (emphasis omitted). Here, we might ask
whether a reasonable prosecutor in the same circumstances would have similarly charged and
bargained for the reasons given. If there were sound reasons to believe that the defendant
faced an excessive punishment at plea or trial, the prosecutor could be asked to explain her
charging and bargaining decisions.
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harsh charge only in order to provoke a plea. Significantly, this
perspective is in keeping with a number of legal theorists, moral
philosophers, and even judges who have argued that reasons and
intentionsand, particularly, purposeful manipulation of anothers
optionsought to be relevant to the coercion analysis.214 As
Wertheimer explained: [W]hen A manipulates B ... we think that
the voluntariness of Bs actions is debatable or at least of a different
sort than when A persuades B.215 More generally, a judge might
take into consideration the relevant bargaining power of the parties
and the manner by which an imbalance may operate systematically
to skew even typical sentences in the direction of excessive punish-
ment.216
214. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 373 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Imple-
mentation of a strategy calculated solely to deter the exercise of constitutional rights is not
a constitutionally permissible exercise of discretion.) (emphasis added); Berman, supra note
19, at 35 (arguing that a penalty is a burden imposed for the purpose of discouraging or pun-
ishing assertion of a ... right) (emphasis added); Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the
Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 100 (1976); cf. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS
49 (1981) (drawing a distinction between staying inside to avoid (1) a lightning strike, (2)
another partys use of electricity, and (3) a partys threat to electrocute); WERTHEIMER, supra
note 17, at 263 (arguing that we feel differently when one feels compelled by circumstances
rather than by anothers intentional actions). Of course, it is no easy feat to identify a
prosecutors purposeful manipulation of her charging authority. As any student of mens rea
may attest, inquiries into the subjective mind are often difficult. But, significantly, judges
make such determinations all the time. In any event, it is sometimes obvious why a
prosecutor has decided to file a high charge. See, e.g., supra notes 146-52 and accompanying
text (discussing the Clarence Aaron prosecution); infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts of Bordenkircher v. Hayes).
215. WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 293.
216. Cf. Farnsworth, supra note 46, at 340 ([I]t must ... be shown that the assent of the
weaker party was induced by unfair persuasion on the part of the stronger. What will be
characterized as unfair depends on a variety of circumstances.); Joel Feinberg, Noncoercive
Exploitation, in PATERNALISM 201, 208-09 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) (arguing that when one
party exploits her superior bargaining power to manipulate the other partys options, the re-
sulting offer is perhaps not just exploitative, but also coercive); Harry G. Frankfurt, Coercion
and Moral Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 65, 71-72 (Ted Honderich ed.,
1973) (explaining that an offer acquires the character of a threat in the face of a power
imbalance that generates an exploitative price); Joan McGregor, Bargaining Advantages
and Coercion in the Market, 14 PHIL. RES. ARCHIVES 23, 24 (1989) ([T]he better off /worse
off distinction ignores the power relationships that occur when there are radically disparate
bargaining strengths.). See generally Grant Lamond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2000) (discussing intentional attempts by one party to exploit bargaining
power).
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C. Proportionality Applied
I admit that what I am after is abstract.217 It would be easier to
draw a proportionality baseline that relied wholly upon statistical
analysis of prevailing practice.218 But I fear that an exclusively
empirical approach to coercion would prove almost as fictive as an
exclusively legalistic approach. Excessive punishment is ultimately
a moral concept, even if intuitions can be tested (at least quasi-
empirically) against practice and experience.219 The risk of a fuzzy
moral concept is that it might collapse into tautologycoercion is
that which is coercive. But, to my thinking, there are at least some
exceptional cases in which we may know coercion when we see it. At
a minimum, I would hope a judge would hold coercive a prosecutors
purposeful manipulation of her charging options to subject a de-
fendant to the unenviable purported choice between an obviously
grossly excessive trial punishment and an arguably excessive negoti-
ated punishment.
This was Justice Powells position in his Bordenkircher v. Hayes
dissent.220 Justice Powell cautioned that a legally valid plea proposal
should not be disturbed except in the most exceptional case.221 And
he felt Bordenkircher was just such a case.222 First, he noted that
even the plea proposal of five years in prison was excessivethat it
hardly could be characterized as a generous offer for the crime of
forging an eighty-eight dollar check.223 Second, he labeled the grim
alternativethe mandatory trial sentence of life without parolea
punishment of unique severity.224 Third, he focused on the prose-
cutors admitted purpose, which was to discourage and ... penal-
ize the defendants exercise of his trial rights by threatening to add
217. Cf. Nussbaum, supra note 194, at 93 ([T]he matter of the practical can be grasped
only crudely by rules given in advance, and adequately only by a flexible judgment suited to
the complexities of the case.).
218. Cf. Bowers & Robinson, supra note 142, at 216 ([E]mpirical desert can be readily
operationalizedits rules and principles can be authoritatively determined through social
science research into peoples shared intuitions of justice.).
219. See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text (discussing virtue ethics and a partic-
ularist approach to proportionality).
220. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368-73 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
222. See id.
223. Id. at 369.
224. Id. at 373.
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a harsh habitual-offender charge that the prosecutor had not seen
fit to file in the first instance.225 Fourth, and perhaps most im-
portantly, he appreciated the dynamic interaction between crimin-
alization, charging discretion, and the potential for bargaining
coercion.226 That is, he determined that the existence of the habitu-
al-offender statute had tipped the scales of the bargaining to
something so unevenly balanced as to arouse suspicion.227
And Justice Powell was not alone. Bob Scott and Bill Stuntz also
questioned whether the prosecutor should have the unchecked
authority to exploit a habitual-offender statute to overcharge and
generate easy pleas.228 Significantly, Scott and Stuntz are generally
regarded as sanguine about the practice of plea bargaining.
Moreover, unlike Justice Powell, they did not consider even the five-
year plea proposal to be wildly beyond the proportional market
price.229 But, against the baseline of that price, they felt that the
trial punishment was obviously grossly excessive.230 This explains
their use of the term overcharge.231 The prosecutor had over-
charged in the retributive sense, not in the legal sense.232 He had
pursued a punishment that no one could want to see imposed under
the circumstances. According to Scott and Stuntz, even the legisla-
ture may have expected that prosecutors would not charge people
like Hayes.233
The prosecutor was morally obliged to exercise charging discre-
tion [to] separat[e] the wheat from the chaff, but he was not legally
obliged to do so.234 And because his moral obligation did not bear on
his legal obligation, he was freely able to exploit his legal authoriza-
tion to compel a plea. His principal incentive was not to do equitable
225. Id.
226. See id. at 372.
227. Id.
228. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1963-65 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 163-
66 and accompanying text.
229. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1964.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 1965.
232. See id.; see also Berman, supra note 19, at 101; Bowers, supra note 73, at 1678-79; cf.
supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial obligation to seek individ-
ualized justice).
233. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1963-64.
234. Id. at 1944; see also infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecutors
obligation to individualize justice).
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justice, but only to increase the likelihood that his offer would be
acceptedand that is how he framed his bargaining strategy.235
Any lingering desire to pursue a proportional punishment was not
only secondary, but also sacrificial and ultimately sacrificed.
Rather than check the prosecutors inequitable overreach, the
Court held fast to its legalistic baseline.236 It thereby failed to reckon
with the obvious pressure intrinsic to a substantial sentence differ-
ential. And it rationalized its abstinence with a curious claim: that
the parties enjoyed relatively equal bargaining power.237 But say-
ing it is so does not make it so. I am not prepared to go as far as
those critics who have likened to torture the prosecutors purposeful
manipulation of a sentencing differential,238 but the Courts rational-
ization feels positively feeble. The availability of the habitual-
offender charge should have dispelled any pretense that the parties
were operating on a level playing field. Only the prosecutor pos-
sessed a cudgel with which to bend the other party to her will. This
is precisely what made Bordenkircher a situation very different
from the give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining, the
Courts reassurances notwithstanding.239
Of course, the practice of plea bargaining always must consist of
some amount of constrained choice, but this was much more than
that. Consider an analogy offered by Scott and Stuntz. They com-
pared the prosecutor to a gas station owner who operates his
business in the middle of a desert.240 The passing motorist may pay
235. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1964.
236. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978).
237. Id. at 362.
238. See Langbein, supra note 88, at 13 n.24 (Like torture, the sentencing differential in
plea bargaining elicits confessions of guilt that would not be freely tendered. It is, therefore,
coercive in the same sense as torture, although not in the same degree.); Frontline: The
Confessions at 38:11 (PBS television broadcast Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/the-confessions/ [https://perma.cc/XN5G-FXL7] (law and literature professor Peter
Brooks explaining that, when the prosecutor makes the defendant aware of describing the
sentencing differential, it is equivalent to the tormentor showing the instruments of tor-
ture); see also Berman, supra note 19, at 98-99 (At least when the difference between y and
y+n is especially pronounced, the thinking goes, the defendant cannot reasonably decline the
prosecutors offer. Acceptance is therefore coerced or involuntary or unfree. There is surely
some sense in which this claim is plausible. But the sense in which it may be true is not a
sense in which it is constitutionally meaningful.) (footnote omitted).
239. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362-63 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,
809 (1970)).
240. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1964.
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a high price, but we would not typically say that he has been
coerced, because the buyers choices (no gas in the desert) [were]
not produced by the sellers actions.241 The analysis changes, how-
ever, when the station owner artificially constrain[s] the buyers
choice by, for instance, tampering with the motorists tires.242 When
a prosecutor manipulates her charging options to threaten excessive
punishment, she is like that disreputable station owner; she has
produced the constrained choice.243
There is a risk that we might take this analogy too far. We might
say that the prosecutor is always responsible for subjecting the de-
fendant to his constrained choice. After all, the prosecutor is the one
who files the charge in the first instance. The prosecutor forces the
defendant into the criminal justice system. On this reading, the
charge is, in all cases, a new element of the defendants situation,
and the plea proposal, in turn, is categorically coercive: If the
defendants baseline is understood as prior to accusation, the prose-
cutors proposal is a threat. If the defendants baseline is understood
as subsequent to accusation, the prosecutors proposal is an offer,
and offers do not coerce.244 But we may draw a line between the
kinds of charges that are consistent with the prosecutors core
mission and those that are not. That line is the proportionality
baseline. The prosecutors moral and professional imperative is
never to pursue excessive punishment, even if her ultimate objective
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Abrams, supra note 38, at 134 (Hayes dilemma was entirely state created.);
Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats v. Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles
of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2016),http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2566053 [https://perma.cc/
93F4-AZ5R] (discussing Bordenkircher and concluding that if concrete evidence did exist that
the prosecutors initial charges were deliberately excessive to coerce plea bargains, that
should suffice to show a due process violation). Indeed, Einer Elhauge has developed a
general theory of state coercion, premised entirely on the impropriety of an officials con-
trived proposal to undertake an otherwise lawful course of action. Elhauge, supra; cf. David
Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121 (1981) (discussing special
interference as relevant to coercion).
244. WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 136; see also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497
(1967) (affirming a coercion claim where the loss of employment is the antithesis of free
choice to speak out or to remain silent); infra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing
new elements as threats).
1128 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1083
is to cow the defendant into accepting a more proportional punish-
ment.245 As Mitchell Berman explained:
If it is constitutionally permissible for prosecutors to try to in-
duce defendants to plead guilty, ... the Court seems to reason, we
must allow them to overcharge. But this is simply wrong. Plea
bargaining is made possible so long as prosecutors are allowed
to offer sentencing discounts; it is not necessary that they also
be allowed to threaten a penalty.246
In Bordenkircher, the prosecutor purposefully disregarded his moral
obligation to do equitable justice.247 He thereby acted impermissib-
ly. Concretely, the States plea proposal was a threat to impose a
penalty; it was coercion.
IV. EXTRALEGALISTIC COERCION & POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
As I mentioned, I have no illusions that the Court actually might
be persuaded to revisit the coercion question as it applies to plea
bargains.248 To the contrary, the Courts prevailing opposition to en-
dorsing a qualitative conception of coercion is in keeping with its
overall resistance to regulating substantive criminal law. The Court
seems to believe that it cannot reach the proportionality question
without abandoning the legality principle, and without also implica-
245. Cf. Berman, supra note 19, at 100-01 (discussing Bordenkircher and concluding that
it is coercive for a prosecutor to threaten a disproportionate sentence); Sarat & Clarke, supra
note 69, at 389-92 (discussing the argument that discretion is a part of the prosecutors re-
sponsibility to seek justice independent of legal guilt).
246. Berman, supra note 19, at 101.
247. See id. at 100 (Overcharging, Justice Powell concluded, is constitutionally imper-
missible.); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 295 n.15 (1987) ([D]ecisions whether
to prosecute and what to charge necessarily are individualized and involve infinite factual
variations.); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (observing that the
prosecutor is expected to exercise discretion and common sense); People v. Byrd, 162 N.W.2d
777, 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (concurring opinion) (It is undoubtedly part of the prosecutors
job to individualize justice.); ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECU-
TORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 3 (1981) (explaining the prosecutors role is to
individualize[] justice ... and mitigate[] the severity of the criminal law); KADISH & KADISH,
supra note 178, at 82 ([I]t is widely accepted that a vital part of the prosecutors official role
is to determine what offenses, and whom, to prosecute, even among provably guilty offenders
and ... the prosecutor must ... balance ... inflexible punishment against the greater impulse
of the quality of mercy.); Bowers, supra note 73, at 1663 n.25.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 84-86, 171.
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ting the substantive scope of the liability and punishment rules that
provide prosecutors with such terrific bargaining leverage in the
first instance.
Going forward, we may expect the Court to continue to craft pro-
cedural standards and rules designed to promote efficient and fair
bargaining, but we should expect no more than that. This Article,
then, is not genuinely prescriptiveor perhaps it is right to say that
it is only prescriptive in order to be provocative. My chief aim is to
take the Court to task for its self-proclaimed inaptitude when it
comes to regulating the substance of plea bargains (and criminal
codes more generally). I think the Court is wrong to have been so
skittish. In fact, it has the capacity to engage effectively in this kind
of regulation.
Elsewhere, it has even done so. In other constitutional contexts,
the Court has articulated, adopted, and applied decidedly extra-
legalistic conceptions of coercion. That is to say, the Court has de-
clared itself sometimes competent to know the qualitative shape of
coercioneven when that shape is less than legally precise. Indeed,
many of the so-called unconstitutional conditions cases could be said
to fall within this category.249 For instance, in United States v.
Jackson, the Court invalidated the portion of a federal kidnapping
statute that authorized imposition of a potential death sentence
only after a jury conviction.250 The Court held that the government
had coerced the defendant by chilling his jury trial right in an
excessive manner.251 Never mind that, when it comes to plea
bargaining, the Court has deemed irrelevant that defendants feel
pressure intrinsic to capital charges.252 My point is only that the
Jackson Court saw fit to make the call. It decided that the chilling
249. See Berman, supra note 19, at 2-3 ([T]he so-called unconstitutional conditions
problem ... has been recognized for well over a century and appears in dozens of doctrinal con-
texts.). Pursuant to the doctrine, the State imposes an unconstitutional condition when it
unduly penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right. See infra text accompanying note 328.
See generally Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995).
250. See 390 U.S. 570, 577-78, 591 (1968).
251. Id. at 582; see also Berman, supra note 19, at 12 (That the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine may be explainable by reference to coercion is intuitive.). See generally Abrams,
supra note 38.
252. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1970) (distinguishing Jackson); see
supra notes 82-83, 91-95 and accompanying text (discussing Brady).
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effect was excessive, as opposed to merely tolerable.253 And it
would seem to me that this question of excessive chilling is no more
clear-cut than the question of excessive punishment with which we
have been concerned.254
A. Justice Robertss Extralegalistic Conception of Coercion
I intend to focus, however, on a setting a bit further afield from
criminal procedure. In National Federation of Independent Busi-
nesses v. Sebelius, the landmark ruling on the constitutionality of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the Court applied
an extralegalistic coercion test to invalidate a condition attached to
the Acts Medicaid provisions.255 The condition specified that a state
would lose all of its Medicaid funds if it failed to expand coverage
substantially.256 Critical to the Courts ruling was the fact that Con-
gress had proposed to withhold funding not only for the Medicaid
expansion, but also for the extension of the preexisting program.257
In other words, if a state refused to expand the program, it also
would lose the money it had been receiving prior to passage of the
Affordable Care Act.258
Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that,
although Congress was free to impose whatever conditions it wished
on the funds designated for the expansion, it was not entitled to
threaten a preexisting subsidy.259 Chief Justice Roberts concluded
that there were really two programs instead of one; the Medicaid
expansion was separate in kind from the Medicaid system that
came before it.260 By this logic, the Court struck down the coercive
253. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582.
254. Cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978) ([N]ot every burden on the exer-
cise of a constitutional right ... is invalid.); Abrams, supra note 38, at 131 (The Supreme
Court has attempted to resolve these cases by determining whether the condition unduly
burdens the constitutional right, or whether it is reasonable, and therefore constitutional.)
(emphasis added).
255. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606-07 (2012).
256. See id. at 2582.
257. See id. at 2603.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 2603-04.
260. Id. at 2605-06.
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conditional threat to the extension, but it upheld the conditional
offer to pay for the expansion.261
In a separate opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Soto-
mayor, acknowledged that a conditional spending measure might be
coercive when it threatens an ancillary program, but she argued
that the extension and the expansion were part and parcel of a
single programMedicaid.262 Finally, Justice Scalia authored a
four-Justice dissent, arguing that it did not matter whether the
extension or the expansion constituted one program or two; the
conditional spending measure was coercive in any event and uncon-
stitutional in its entirety.263 Thus, seven Justices held that at least
some part of the spending measure was coercive, and all nine Jus-
tices accepted that a conditional spending measure might coerce.264
The difference between the Roberts and Ginsburg opinions boils
down to a fight over baselines and how they should apply. Roberts
relied upon both predictive and normative baselines. First, on the
predictive front, Chief Justice Roberts noted that, as a new program,
the Medicaid expansion threatened the preexisting Medicaid
program in a manner that the states could not have anticipated.265
Justice Ginsburg responded that the expansion constituted merely
a modification of the old program, and modifications were neither
new nor surprising.266 Congress had changed the program previ-
ously, and the states should have expected it might do so again.267
Thus, we may say that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg
agreed upon a predictive baseline but not upon the facts with which
it was set.
Second, on the normative front, Chief Justice Roberts did some-
thing much more interesting. He adopted a patently extralegalistic
conception of coercion that allowed him to consider all the circum-
stances and determine that some forms of governmental pressure
are just too much pressure regardless of legal entitlement. That is,
261. See id. at 2608.
262. See id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. See id. at 2642-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264. See id. at 2607 (majority opinion); id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring part and dis-
senting in part); id. at 2666-67 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. See id. at 2605-06 (majority opinion) (describing the Medicaid expansion as an unan-
ticipated retroactive condition[] that accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree).
266. See id. at 2635-39 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
267. See id. at 2638-39.
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Chief Justice Roberts conceded that Congress was constitutionally
authorized to establish both versions of Medicaidor, for that
matter, to eliminate Medicaid altogetherbut he concluded that
legal authority was not dispositive under the circumstances.268
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg endorsed a legalistic baseline.
Measured against that baseline, she described the matter as a
simple case.269 Congress had proposed to provide only benefits to
those states that chose to participate in the administration of a
constitutionally permissible programa program that the federal
government could have administered itself: [Congress does not] use
Medicaid funding to induce States to take action Congress itself
could not undertake. The Federal Government undoubtedly could
operate its own health-care program for poor persons, just as it
operates Medicare for seniors health care. That is what makes ...
the Courts decision so unsettling.270
In this vein, Justice Ginsburg distinguished NFIB from other po-
tentially coercive spending measures.271 She explained, for instance,
that a coercion question had arisen in the seminal spending case,
South Dakota v. Dole, only because Congress had proposed to do
through conditional highway spending something that it potentially
lacked the constitutional authority to do on its own: set a national
drinking age.272
Perhaps one might respond that, by virtue of the NFIB ruling,
Congress also lacked the constitutional authority to threaten the
Medicaid extension. But that puts the cart before the horse. The
Court first had to determine that there was coercion, thereby
making the condition unconstitutional. And a legalistic baselineof
the kind that has animated plea bargaining jurisprudence all
alongcould not get the Court there. If the Court had applied a
legalistic baseline, it would have had to treat Congress like the
268. See id. at 2578-79, 2608 (majority opinion).
269. Id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
270. Id.; cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 81 (1936) (noting that the [t]hreat of loss,
not hope of gain, is the essence of ... coercion). 
271. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(This case does not present the concerns that led the Court [previously] ... even to consider
the prospect of coercion.).
272. See id. (distinguishing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)); Berman, supra note
19, at 29 (The federal government has no authority to order the states to establish particular
minimum drinking ages.).
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bargaining prosecutor who operates within her legal authority when
she proposes to file a valid charge. The Court would have had to
recognize that Congress was constitutionally entitled to do what it
wanted to do for whatever reason, just as the prosecutorwith prob-
able causeis constitutionally entitled to charge what she wants to
charge for whatever reason. On this score, consider an analogy to
the prosecutor in Bordenkircher.273 He proposed to add a new charge
as leverage to get the defendant to accept conditions on an old
charge.274 The prosecutor coupled a legally permissible new charge
to a legally permissible old charge, just as Congresson Chief
Justice Robertss readingcoupled a legally permissible new pro-
gram to a legally permissible old program. According to a legalistic
baseline, there was no coercion in either case.275
If Chief Justice Robertss operative normative baseline was not
legalistic, what was it? I think it obvious that his baseline was
grounded in a structural principlethe principle of federalism.276 I
do not claim that the principle of federalism has much in common
with the principle of proportionality. But they do share a distinctive
characteristicfederalism is an extralegalistic principle, just as
proportionality is an extralegalistic principle.277 Both principles lay
the groundwork for a capacious and contextual reading of permis-
sibility.
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts was unconstrained by legality.
He was willing to determine that, all things considered, it was im-
proper to put so much pressure on a statethat Congress had upset
the abstract balance of power between national and state govern-
273. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
274. See id. at 358-59.
275. See id. at 365.
276. Sam Bagenstos has called this the anti-leveraging principlethat spending condi-
tions cannot unduly threaten other significant independent grants. Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 865,
869 (2013). Whatever the name, it remains extralegalistic.
277. Admittedly, one could point to the Tenth Amendment as a legal basis for the federal-
ism principle. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. However, one could just as readily point to the
Eighth Amendment as a legal basis for the proportionality principle. See U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. In either event, even though the given amendment may be animated by the given
principle, it has not been interpreted, as a matter of positive doctrine, to reach the federalism
coercion question presented in NFIB or the proportionality coercion question presented in
Bordenkircher. In that way, we may say that the existence of the Tenth Amendment does not
undercut the conclusion that NFIB depended upon an extralegalistic reading.
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ments.278 In this way, Chief Justice Robertss test was undertheoriz-
ed and particularistica test without a test. He expressed little
concern for the fuzzy line or the slippery slope. He just called it as
he saw ita gun to the head.279 He never tried to identify precisely
at what point persuasion gives way to coercion.280 To the contrary,
he just accepted that wherever that line may be, this statute is
surely beyond it.281
Notably, a number of critics have faulted the opinion for just this
reason. Neal Katyal, for instance, dubbed the Courts ruling an
extraconstitutional limit and a worrisome development.282 And
Justice Ginsburg seemed to agree: The coercion inquiry ... appears
to involve political judgments that defy judicial calculation.... [C]on-
ceptions of impermissible coercion premised on States perceived
inability to decline federal funds are just too amorphous to be
judicially administrable.283
As should be apparent by now, I have comparatively more confi-
dence in the Court to reach these kinds of qualitative judgments. I
just wish the Court more consistently had the same confidence in
itself.
B. Reforms Revisited
I do not mean to make too much of the overlap; there are plenty
of reasons not to carry over a coercion test from conditional
278. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2628 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts made something of the same normative
point with respect to the Affordable Care Acts so-called individual mandate. Interpreting the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court had never previously ascribed weight-bearing
meaning to the term proper. However, Chief Justice Roberts noted: Even if the individual
mandate is necessary to the Acts insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is
not a proper means for making those reforms effective. Id. at 2592 (majority opinion). Again,
the message seems to be that this kind of governmental overreach is just not normatively
acceptable.
279. Id. at 2604 (majority opinion).
280. Id. at 2606.
281. Id.
282. Neal K. Katyal, Opinion, A Pyrrhic Victory, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/06/29/opinion/in-health-care-ruling-a-pyrrhic-victory.html?ref=opinion
[https://perma.cc/F7T6-6GP4].
283. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cita-
tions omitted).
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spending to plea bargaining.284 But Chief Justice Robertss opinion
is instructive. It may serve as a useful reminder to plea bargaining
reformers that legal guilt is but one potential constitutional line;
normative guilt is another. And once we move beyond a legalistic
baseline, there is plenty of room to evaluate coercion according to
any of the many other viable and persuasive principles. From there,
we may fairly conclude that, under certain circumstances, a charge
may coerce even if it is legally permissible. Chief Justice Robertss
opinion has modeled for the Court what it might have done with
plea bargains and substantive criminal law, if only it were not so
timid.
I would add only that Chief Justice Robertss opinion even has a
framework modeled for concrete plea bargaining reforms. First,
there would seem to be some similarity not only between the coer-
cive spending condition in NFIB and the kind of charge bargaining
at issue in Bordenkircher, but also between the spending condition
and so-called wired plea deals. A wired plea entails a proposal to go
easy on a codefendant or a potential codefendant (typically, a family
member or friend) in exchange for a guilty plea from the defen-
dant.285 The proposal thereby wires the defendants cases together,
just like charge bargaining wires charges together, and, more to the
point, just like the Medicaid spending condition wired purportedly
separate Medicaid programs together.286 Even if the system toler-
ates plea bargaining generally, we may think that there is some-
thing much more troubling about a prosecutors effort to bind
together in the negotiation process separate criminal charges, cases,
or defendants.287
284. For example, on federalism questions, there is the need to promote political account-
ability by making plain which actorstate or federalis responsible for which governmental
decision or action. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992); cf. FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982) ([H]aving the power to make decisions and to set policy
is what gives the State its sovereign nature.). On the other side, there are liberty and auton-
omy considerations distinct to the criminal justice context that would seem to demand closer
attention to whether a pleading defendant is acting according to his own free will. This is all
to say that each context is animated by its own unique considerations.
285. See, e.g., United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1018-19, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing wired bargain constitutionally voluntary when defendant accepted a life sentence so his
wife could receive a five-year sentence).
286. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06.
287. Generally speaking, charge bargaining is a plea bargaining practice that critics have
singled out as particularly problematic. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809
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Second, even if we accept the constitutionality of conventional
charge bargaining and wired pleas, we still may disapprove of
threats to add a charge, as the prosecutor did in Bordenkircher.288
Here, the criticism is that the prosecutor should have to charge
everything upfront or not at all.289 In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts
took seriously the notion that states had come to rely upon an expec-
tation that they would continue to receive the preexisting Medicaid
funds.290 Likewise, the defendant in Bordenkircher tried to claim
that he had come to rely upon an expectation that he would
continue to face only the preexisting forgery charge.291 The framing
is critical. Again, if the habitual offender charge is considered a
new element of the defendants situation, then it is more likely to
be thought of as a threat.292 Chief Justice Robertss approach to
coercion could have provided a prophylactic against the prosecutor
in Bordenkircher upping the ante by threatening the habitual of-
fender charge.293
Third, Chief Justice Robertss remedy for the constitutional
violation in NFIB may attract even a plea bargaining reformer.
Significantly, Chief Justice Roberts did not invalidate the Medicaid
expansion; he just softened the blow for noncompliance.294 That is,
he upheld the Medicaid expansion but struck down the threat to the
extension.295 By uncoupling the extension from the expansion, he
managed to eliminate the penalty while preserving the benefits,
thereby transforming a threat into an offer.296 This sounds suspi-
(1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between charge bargaining and the normal
give and take of plea bargaining); cf. WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 132 ([E]ven on Bren-
nans view, normal plea bargaining does not compromise the voluntariness of guilty pleas.).
See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
288. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361 (1978).
289. See id. at 361 n.6.
290. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664.
291. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358-59.
292. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing new elements as threats); cf.
WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 225 ([A]ssuming that B would not be made worse off if she
spurned As offer than if there had been no offer at all, there is no reason to regard As
proposal as coercive.).
293. Contra Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362-63, 365 (concluding that the prosecutor was not
upping the ante but was engaging only in the give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining).
294. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
295. See id.
296. See id.
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ciously like the remedy proposed by Scott and Stuntz to check
prosecutorial exploitation of prevailing bargaining imbalances.297
That is, in exceptional circumstances, they would have allowed
judges to soften the blow by deviating downward from excessively
disproportionate plea prices.298
Let me reiterate that my position is not that the Court should
adopt any of these particular reforms (though I do favor some of
them, particularly the judicial opportunity to reduce harsh bar-
gained penalties).299 Again, I merely hope to highlight that the
Court has developed its own positive prototypes that it could use to
invigorate constitutional consideration of plea bargaining coer-
cionif only it had the desire to do so.
C. Justice Scalias Extralegalistic Conception of Coercion
Justice Scalia took an even less law-bound approach to coercion
in his NFIB dissenta remarkable departure from the hyper-
legalistic perspective that animated his opinions in Lafler and Frye.
Indeed, in NFIB, Justice Scalia did not just abandon the legality
principle as a baseline for measuring coercion; he arguably aban-
doned baselines altogether. That is, his dissent can be read to en-
dorse the claim that even an offer sometimes may coercethat
carrots have the capacity to overbear the will almost as readily as
sticks do.300
This conception of coercion is unusual but not unprecedented. It
is a view espoused typically by Marxists and other critics of capit-
alismnot Justice Scalias obvious ideological brethren. The logic
is that, under sufficiently unequal market conditions, some offers
may appear too good to refuse, but only because the weaker partys
options are so dismal to begin with.301 Per Justice Scalia, the choice
297. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1959-60.
298. See id. at 1960.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08.
300. See infra notes 304-15 and accompanying text.
301. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophys entry on coercion:
Dealings in capitalist markets are often highly exploitative.... Given the potency
such offers possess, one might suspect that there are many offers that one can-
not reasonably refuse, possibly reflecting great imbalances in power or prior
historical injustices between the bargaining parties.... When one party is in a
much stronger bargaining position than another, the stronger party sometimes
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between these options is coerced if in some sense the choice is so
stark that it overwhelms the states ability to make a real choice, so
that the states choice whether to enact or administer a federal regu-
latory program is rendered illusory. [I]f States really have no choice
other than to accept the package, the offer is coercive, and the
conditions cannot be sustained under the spending power.302
The reference to stark choices might as well have been a descrip-
tion of the sentencing differential between plea and trial prices.
Here, Justice Scalia sounded at least a bit like John Langbein, who
provocatively claimed that a sentencing differential may coerce in
the same sense as torture.303 If nothing else, we may conclude that,
pursuant to Justice Scalias approach, Bordenkircher becomes an
easy case. It would not have mattered even if the prosecutor had
charged the habitual offender count prenegotiation, as opposed to
postnegotiation. In either event, the starkand thereby coercive
choice remained present.
In NFIB, Justice Scalia also offered the hypothetical of an almost
limitless education funding grant.304 It provides an even better anal-
ogy to Bordenkircher. That is, Justice Scalia explained that it surely
would be unconstitutional for Congress to induce states to establish
a national education system by offering a [funding] grant equal to
the States entire annual expenditures for primary and secondary
education.305 According to Justice Scalia, the proposal would be
practically irresistible and therefore coercive, notwithstanding the
uses its advantage to keep for itself most or all of the gains to be had from coop-
erative interaction between the parties. So employers who are in a stronger
bargaining position than their employees may exploit them by paying them a
small fraction of the value their labor contributes.
Coercion, STAN.ENCYCLOPEDIAPHIL., http://plato.stanford.du/entries/coercion/ [https://perma.
cc/J9KP-HYDR] (last updated Oct. 27, 2011); cf. Virginia Held, Coercion and Coercive Offers,
in COERCION 49, 58 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972) (A person unable
to spurn an offer may act as unwillingly as a person unable to resist a threat.). A number of
theorists have claimed that no analysis of coercion is complete without some consideration of
relative bargaining power and the stronger partys subjective intention to take advantage of
it. See McGregor, supra note 216, at 24 ([T]he better off /worse off  distinction ignores the
power relationships that occur when there are radically disparate bargaining strengths.);
supra note 218 and accompanying text. See generally David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage
Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121 (1981).
302. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2660-61 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
303. Langbein, supra note 88, at 13 n.24; see also supra note 238 and accompanying text.
304. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
305. Id.
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absence of any threat to a preexisting program.306 Again, this is an
unconventional perspective. The traditional view is that, as long as
a state is free to forego the education grant, and it is not made
worse off by doing so, then there is no coercion, only a persuasively
good offer.307 Likewise, as we have seen already, defendants are
thought to be free to forego attractive plea proposals. The sentenc-
ing differential is said to mark only the attractiveness of the plea
offerthe magnitude of the bargaining benefits.308 But Justice
Scalia abandoned the formal distinction between offers and
threats.309 In the federalism context, Justice Scalia believed they are
often one and the same. In the words of Harry Frankfurt, an offer
acquires the character of a threat in the face of a power imbalance
that generates an exploitative price.310
Even Chief Justice Roberts felt compelled to retain the orthodox
boundary between attractive offers and coercive threats: States are
separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act
like it.311 By also abandoning that boundary, Justice Scalia appar-
ently was comfortable with an even more abstract test for coercion.
He refused to fix the outermost line ... [of] coercion,312 observing
that [w]hether federal spending legislation crosses the line from en-
ticement to coercion is often difficult to determine.313 By Justice
Scalias estimation, the coercive nature of [the] offer [was] unmis-
takably clear, but, in turn, he failed to make unmistakably clear
precisely what went into his estimation.314 Justice Scalia merely
306. See id. at 2661-62.
307. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 301, at 124.
308. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
309. See supra text accompanying note 300.
310. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS 33 (1988); see also Held, supra note 301, at 58 (An unreasonable incentive to accept
a good might be no less coercive than an unreasonable incentive to avoid an evil.). But cf.
WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 230 (explaining that an exploitative price is not, by itself,
coercive).
311. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603.
312. Id. at 2606.
313. Id. at 2662 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
314. Id. (If the anticoercion rule does not apply in this case, then there is no such rule.).
Notably, Justice Scalia apparently considered congressional intent to be a relevant factor. See
id. Specifically, he ascribed to Congress an intent to coerce, which, by his lights, made a find-
ing of coercion that much more obvious. See id. (Congress unambiguously signaled its belief
that every State would have no real choice but to go along with the Medicaid Expansion.);
cf. id. at 2635, 2637-38 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (considering
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concluded that Congress [had] plainly crossed the line distinguish-
ing encouragement from coercion.315 In this way, we may describe
Justice Scalias approach as functionalist. States are coerced when
they enjoy no practical independence (and states often lack practical
independence under prevailing unequal structural conditions). To
promote practical choice, the Court must be willing to check federal
power, extralegally.
In the plea bargaining context, this methodology has never held
sway. No majority has ever held that, in the face of an excessively
harsh mandatory sentencing law, a plea proposal could be coercive.
No majority has ever acknowledged that, even if a plea proposal has
made a defendant significantly better off than he was legally
entitled to be, it could be only because he was made so impermis-
sibly bad off to begin with. But these are the practical realities of
the plea bargaining market, as Scott and Stuntz realized: [A] defen-
dant ... would be better off if the prosecutor could not bargain at all:
in that event, the prosecutor would probably drop the recidivist
charge, since she would get nothing out of it.316
In cases like Bordenkircher, there is just too much punishment in
play; in Justice Scalias education hypothetical, there is just too
much money in play. If one is coercive, we should perhaps be willing
to say that the other is too. In both settings, the stronger party
manufactures ostensible options, but only a fool would choose not to
cooperate.317 More to the point, only a fool would even call the
options a genuine choice in the first instance.318
Plausibly, we might frame Justice Scalias dissent slightly differ-
ently. We might say that Justice Scalia did not, in fact, abandon all
what she perceived to be a lack of congressional intent as relevant to her conclusion that the
Medicaid expansion was not coercive). Again, Justice Scalias position has support. See supra
notes 263-64 and accompanying text. However, it is a perspective that is wholly foreign to the
Courts conception of coercion as it applies to plea bargaining practiceand likewise to crim-
inal justice more generally. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. As we discussed
in the context of Bordenkircher, all that mattered to the Court was formal legalitythe
existence of charges supported by probable cause. STUNTZ, supra note 6, at 258.
315. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1965.
317. See Farnsworth, supra note 46, at 339 (referencing coercion test that asks whether
there was no reasonable alternative); see also supra note 301 and accompanying text (discus-
sing coercive offers).
318. See Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 139, at 38 (describing this choice as a
Hobsons choicea choice that offers only one [genuine] option).
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baselines. Rather, his operative baseline was just some intangible
conception of how our federal structure ought to work. And it is
against that baseline that threats are identified. In the end, how-
ever, I do not think that the distinction matters much. More to the
point, I am sympathetic to either reading. How could I not be? After
all, I have endorsed a proportionality baseline that could be
considered only slightly more tangible. But that is my prerogative
as a pragmatist. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, was the Courts
chief proponent of the rule of law as a law of rules.319 Even in the
federalism context, Justice Scalia once cautioned: [A]n imprecise
barrier against federal intrusion upon state authority is not likely
to be an effective one.320 The surprise, then, is that Scaliaof all
Justiceswould have championed such an inexact approach. 
So what is going on? Why the uncharacteristic move? Did Justice
Scalia become a pragmatist overnight? Of course not. He just be-
lieved deeply in a national government of limited powerdeeply
enough that he felt the need to take a pragmatic stand, at least just
this once. Justice Scalias normative commitment was the principle
of federalism. And coercion has the capacity to bend to this or that
normative commitment.
I am content with this. It is a defensible methodological move to
bend coercion to normative commitmentbut only to the extent that
the underlying normative commitment is a defensible one, furthered
openly and without unduly compromising some other important
value. Indeed, the aim of my research agenda to date has been to
defend my own normative commitmenta commitment to check
equitably police and prosecutorial power without unduly compromis-
ingtheprinciple of legality.321 Thus, I am attracted to Justice Scalias
319. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175
(1989); see, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (reasoning that a bright-line ap-
proach best serves the essential interest in readily administrable rules). Apparently, Justice
Ginsburg was surprised too. She invoked Justice Scalias seminal article in her criticism of
the Court. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Scalia, supra).
320. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997). Even more so in the criminal justice
context, Justice Scalia has rejected imprecise measuresnot only with respect to plea bar-
gaining practices, but also with respect to criminalization and other questions. See supra
notes 122-29, 165 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalias dissents in Lafler and
Frye, and quoting his majority opinion in Whren).
321. See generally Bowers, supra note 73; Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 139; Bowers,
Normative Grand Juries, supra note 174; Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, supra note 1.
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one-time pragmatism because it provides tangential support for my
own normative perspective: that the criminal justice system should
do more to regulate inequitable exercises of executive discretion.
CONCLUSION
Imagine a world in which Supreme Court Justices regularly read
law review articles and essays.322 All the more fantastic, imagine
that they were persuaded to respond to interlocutors. And more in-
credible still, imagine that they were won over by this or that critics
claim. How would they reply to me if I somehow convinced them to
follow the logic of Lafler and Frye and abandon their legalistic
baseline? Would they transition to a normative baseline grounded
in the principle of proportionality? Almost certainly not.323 They
would fall back, instead, on an alternative normative baseline
anchored to a prudential principle that has been doing significant
work all along. That principle is naked expediencethe cold, hard
fact that, as currently constructed, the system would crumble with-
out the practice of plea bargaining.
This is the real triumph of plea bargaining.324 Plea bargaining
conquered practice, and the Court followed suit, crafting doctrines
to accommodate iteven to nudge it along. Just one year after the
Court first considered the constitutionality of plea bargaining, it
declared the negotiated conviction to be an essential component of
the administration of justiceone that is to be encouraged.325
And, in order to adequately encourage it, the Court has refused to
regulate it substantively. That is the thrust of the Courts observa-
tion that acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining
322. Cf. Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews that Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-reviews.html?_
r=0 [https://perma.cc/U8BU-A4EH].
323. See supra text accompanying note 171.
324. See Berman, supra note 19, at 98 n.414 (referencing the pressures inexorably favoring
plea bargaining in American legal culture (citing George Fisher, Plea Bargainings Triumph,
109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000))).
325. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (noting that plea bargains are important components of this countrys
criminal justice system).
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necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is
involuntary in a constitutional sense.326
In this vein, we may say that plea bargaining has come to rest
comfortably on its own normative foundationa pragmatic and
almost quasimoral foundation.327 This explains why the Court has
never taken seriously the claim that the pressure to waive trial
rights amounts to an unconstitutional condition. The unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine asks whether the chilling effect on the
exercise of a constitutional right is excessive, unnecessary, or
undue.328 By the Courts estimation, the chilling effect of plea
bargaining practice is never excessive or undue; to the contrary, it
is entirely necessarynecessary enough to be nurtured.329
Occasionally, a student in my plea bargaining seminar will ident-
ify what I take to be an accurate overarching theme to the case law:
In some cases the prosecutor wins; in other cases the defendant
wins; but in all cases plea bargaining wins. This does not mean that
the Court has wholly declined the opportunity to exercise constitu-
tional oversight. To the contrary, it has developed a rich jurispru-
dence designed to ensure that our system of pleas is properly
administered.330 The Court has exercised a kind of quality control
326. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978) (To hold that the prosecutors
desire to induce a guilty plea ... may play no part in his charging decision, would contradict
the very premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining itself.). Moreover, it is a
perspective that Lafler and Frye did nothing to diminish. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,
1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ([W]e accept plea bargaining because many believe that
without it our long and expensive process of criminal trial could not sustain the burden
imposed on it, and our system of criminal justice would grind to a halt.); Missouri v. Frye,
132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (The reality is that plea bargains have become ... central to the
administration of the criminal justice system.). To the contrary, with the Courts recognition
that plea bargaining is the criminal justice system, the Court just made all the more explicit
its prudential commitment. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14,
at 1912).
327. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 140 (The Court has held that because plea bar-
gaining serves the societys interests, it is not immoral.).
328. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968). See generally supra notes 249-54
and accompanying text (discussing unconstitutional conditions). Indeed, the Jackson Court
expressly distinguished guilty pleas, observing that the automatic rejection of all guilty pleas
would rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 584 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
329. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 17, at 138-39 (observing that, according to the Court, the
chilling effect of plea bargaining is not needless because ... the state cannot afford the
alternatives).
330. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260; see also supra note 100 (discussing Santobello).
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over the procedural mechanisms of the machinery of criminal jus-
tice.331 But it consistently has refused to exercise quality control
over the substantive penalties that plea bargains produce.
Why has the Court proven comparatively so ready to exercise
procedural quality controlto rectify the intermittent unfortunate
lapse in orderly ... procedures?332 Because an unreliable procedure
generates an unreliable and inefficient market.333 Consider the cases
in which the Court has invalidated guilty pleas. The judge is re-
quired to develop an adequate recordthe better to foreclose a
frivolous appeal.334 The defense attorney is required to provide
effective assistance of counselthe better to convince a stubborn
client to take a good deal.335 The prosecutor is required to keep her
promisesthe better to maintain the credibility of her offers and
threats.336 These procedural rules and standards serve primarily to
keep the guilty-plea apparatus humming along smoothly.337
There is obvious truth to the notion that our criminal justice sys-
tem depends upon plea bargaining.338 I would not deny it for a mo-
ment. But I take that to be a sign of its strength, not its weakness.
Plea bargaining is an entrenched practice. It is not going anywhere.
Moreover, I think it is in the nature of any human systempar-
ticularly an overburdened oneto tend toward compromise as much
as toward conflict. In this way, negotiation is something of an inevit-
able social and adjudicative fact. It will happen. But, as with any
human system, the institutional actors who operate the levers of
power are prone to pursue improper objectivesobjectives informed
331. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012).
332. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
333. See id.; see also Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 1, at 58 n.35 (explaining
that cases like Santobello can be re-read as an effort to cement a set of national (and consti-
tutional) contract standards to promote fair and efficient bargaining).
334. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 247 (1969).
335. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010); Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel,
supra note 1, at 1136.
336. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262.
337. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338. See Abrams, supra note 38, at 133 ([I]f one in five defendants demanded all such
[trial] rights, our criminal justice resources would be exhausted.); Bowers, Two Rights to
Counsel, supra note 1, at 1140 ([T]he criminal justice system would grind to a halt without
well-oiled guilty-plea machinery.).
2016] PLEA BARGAININGS BASELINES 1145
by self-interest and professional and cognitive biases.339 And this is
why oversightsubstantive as well as proceduralis indispensable. 
Furthermore, because our criminal codes serve to empower state
actors (perhaps just as much as they constrain them), we cannot
count upon the prevailing principle of legality to provide all of the
oversight that a sound system should demand. This has been the
point of my Articlewe need equitable checks, too. 
If plea bargaining is here to stay, then why has the Court proven
so unwilling to do more? The easy answer is that it has no incentive
to tinker.340 The Court may well understand that its tinkering will
not upend the institution, but it nevertheless could conclude that
tinkering is just not worth the very slight risk or the admittedly
larger administrative headache that it entails. I have a lingering
fear, however, that something else is at play. I worry that judges
also might be motivated by a more troubling normative commit-
menta bias (subconscious, perhaps) that it is appropriate for the
prosecutor to bully the defendant for the simple reason that the
defendant is probably guilty. Returning to the paradigmatic exam-
ple of the slave who is threatened with a beating for not working on
his normal day of rest, we concluded that the slave was coerced
according to a moral-philosophic normative baseline because he
never should have been subjected to bondage in the first place.341
The contrary perspective, in the plea bargaining context, is that the
probably guilty defendant is exactly where he ought to be.342
If this bias is doing real work, then itand not my proportional-
ity baselineis the genuine threat to the legality principle. It
amounts to a base desire for rough and summary justice punish-
ment without process. And that is the most undeserved penalty of
all, particularly in a criminal justice systemsuch as ourswhere
wide racial and economic (and otherwise inequitable) disparities
exist in the treatment of probably guilty offenders.
339. See Bowers, supra note 73, at 1660 (examining the sometimes improper incentives and
biases that shape prosecutors charging and bargaining decisions); Bowers, Punishing the
Innocent, supra note 139 (same).
340. As John Langbein explained: [A] legal system will do almost anything, tolerate
almost anything, before it will admit the need for reform in its system of proof and trial.
Langbein, supra note 88, at 19.
341. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
342. Cf. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1929-30 (distinguishing plea bargaining from
contracts of enslavement).

